



R. FRITH

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THE BILLS OF PARLIAMENT THAT CONCERNED

THE REVOLUTION

THE INTERESTS OF LONDON, MANCHESTER

AND OTHER CITIES

AND OF THE PARTIES AND CANDIDATES

BY

JOHN RUSSELL

VOLUME II

A BOOK PREPARED FOR THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON EDUCATION
AND AGRICULTURE

LONDON 1877



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THE ROLE OF CONSTITUENCY PARTY ORGANIZATIONS
IN REPRESENTING
THE INTERESTS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES
AND OTHER GROUPS

Political Parties and Canadian Unity

by

PETER MALCOLM LESLIE

(VOLUME II)

PAGE TWO

A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism
and Biculturalism

August 1967

THE RULES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
IN REPRESENTATION
THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE
AND THEIR RIGHTS

Political Science and Government



Political Science and Government

A Study prepared for the Royal Commission on the Status of Women
and the Status of Women

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THE STATE OF TEXAS IN 1845
AND THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY

It would be difficult to find a more
favorable opportunity for a study of
the history of Texas in 1845, and
the problem of slavery, than in the
present state of Texas. The history
of Texas in 1845, and the problem
of slavery, is a subject of great
importance to the people of Texas.
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the problem of slavery, is a subject
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PART TWO

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the history of Texas in 1845, and
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CHAPTER 6

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN PROMOTING THE INTERESTS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES

It would be simply suicidal to French Canadians to form a party by themselves. Why, so soon as French Canadians, who are in the minority in this House and in the country, were to organize as a political party, they would compel the majority to organize as a political party, and the result must be disastrous to themselves. We have only one way of organizing parties. This country must be governed and can be governed simply on questions of policy and administration. . . .

Laurier¹

Can an ethnic minority use a political party as an instrument--presumably one of several--for achieving equality of status with the majority, without sacrificing its cultural identity?

One of the most obvious facts about politics in Westmorland, as elsewhere in New Brunswick, is the identification of the Acadians with the Liberal Party. In Brome-Missisquoi, on the other hand, although the ethnic composition is also mixed (with neither group possessing an overwhelming majority) it is difficult to discover how, if at all, ethnicity affects voting behaviour. Why the difference? What is its significance?

* * *

¹Canada, H.C. Debates. Session 1886, v. 1, p. 175. (March 16)

In the United States, successive immigrant groups have used politics as a means of obtaining equal status with other groups which had forged themselves a pedigree. Political power is one of a number of mutually-supporting factors which have produced the rise of ethnic minorities to positions of wealth and respectability in American cities.

The first step in this process, according to Samuel Lubell, is the acquisition of economic power by a few individuals within the ethnic group, by virtue of their individual "drive" or determination; then with the development of this form of indigenous leadership, comes a sort of collective political bargaining which wins elective and patronage positions for members of the ethnic group. This in turn contributes to the power of the group as a whole, because those who have achieved office (whether by election or by appointment) can continue to bring in others of their group. Where the group is particularly strong in numbers it may even succeed in passing legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, education, use of public facilities and restaurants, etc. In outlining this process, Samuel Lubell writes:

[The leadership of Italo-Americans] came not from the most oppressed and discontented, but from those with the strongest middle-class drive. The same pattern holds for other minority elements as well. None were stirred to political uprising when their grievances were heaviest. It was as they emerged from the social cellar and

got their first whiffs of the fresher, middle-class air that their political spirits quickened. The key to the political progress of any minority element in this country would seem to lie in just this success in developing its own middle class. Sheer numbers alone are not sufficient for political power. To be effective, numbers must be supported by economic, educational and social progress....To register its political strength a minority group has to have its own lawyers or leaders with equivalent training. In turn, the broader the middle-class base developed by any upclimbing element, the more clamorous its demands for political recognition. 1

Daniel Bell, discussing the same topic, tends to place less emphasis on the necessity of developing middle class leaders within an ethnic group as a preliminary step to the achievement of political power by the group as a whole, but his analysis suggests an even closer link between politics and the rise of ethnic groups. According to Bell, wealth obtained from syndicated crime and gambling has been used to control political machines, which have then been used to gain power, prestige, and eventually respectability for successive waves of immigrants. In discussing the successive "arrival" of Jewish, Irish and Italian groups, Bell writes:

Among Jewish lawyers, a small minority, such as the "Tammany lawyer" (like the protagonist of Sam Ornitz's Haunch, Paunch, and Jowl), rose through politics and occasionally touched the fringes of

¹Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Harper, 1952), pp. 75-6.

crime. Most of the Jewish lawyers, by and large the communal leaders, climbed rapidly, however, in the opportunities that established and legitimate Jewish wealth provided.

Irish immigrant wealth in the northern urban centers, concentrated largely in construction, trucking, and the waterfront, has, to a substantial extent, been wealth accumulated in and through political alliance, e.g. favoritism in city contracts. Control of the politics of the city thus has been crucial for the continuance of Irish political wealth. This alliance of Irish immigrant wealth and politics has been reciprocal; many noted Irish political figures lent their names as important window-dressing for business corporations...while Irish businessmen have lent their wealth to further the careers of Irish politicians.

The Italians found the more obvious big city paths from rags to riches pre-emptedThe children of the immigrants, the second and third generation, became wise in the ways of the urban slums. Excluded from the political ladder--in the early thirties there were almost no Italians on the city payroll in top jobs, nor in the books of the period can one find discussion of Italian political leaders--and finding few open routes to wealth, some turned to illicit ways....Yet it was, oddly enough, the quondam racketeer, seeking to become respectable, who provided one of the major supports for the drive to win a political voice for Italians in the power structure of the urban political machines. This rise of the Italian political bloc was connected, at least in the major northern urban centers, with another important development which tended to make the traditional relation between the politician and the protected or tolerated illicit operator more close than it had been in the past. This is the fact that the urban political machines had to evolve new forms of fund-raising, since the big business contributions, which once went heavily into municipal politics, now--with the shift in the locus of power--go largely

into national affairs....One way that urban political machines raised their money... (was) by "taxing" the large number of municipal employees who bargain collectively with City Hall for their wage increases.... A second method was taxing the gamblers.... A third source for the financing of these machines was the new, and often illegally earned, Italian wealth. This is well illustrated by the career of Costello and his emergence as a political power in New York. Here the ruling motive has been the search for an entree-for oneself and one's ethnic group--into the ruling circles of the big city.¹

These accounts of how successive minority ethnic groups rose to political power illustrate how ethnic minorities have used it as a lever to gain entry on a less unequal basis into American society. In other words, the political party acted as an important vehicle of social mobility. Let us turn again to Samuel Lubell:

[/In Rhode Island_] the first break in the Republican power structure came in 1928, when the property qualification on voting [in municipal politics_] was repealed. With an enlarged electorate, the Democrats swept most of the city councils in 1930. They shrewdly used the spoils of office to give recognition to all of Rhode Island's minorities--Italo-American, Jews, French-Canadians and others.

With Roosevelt's triumph in 1932 the patronage at the disposal of the Democrats swelled anew. Again, it was used to cement the Democratic following among the minority groups in preparation for the assault on the Statehouse, which finally fell in 1934.

Patronage is peculiarly important for minor-

¹Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (2nd. ed. rev.; New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 141-3.

ity groups, involving much more than the mere spoils of office. Each first appointment given a member of any underdog element is a boost in that element's struggle for social acceptance. It means that another barrier to their advance has been lifted, another shut door has swung open... the opening of these new opportunities, in turn, stimulates the political consciousness of the group, encouraging its leaders to eye the next highest post on the patronage ladder.

The success of this tactic depends on the members of an ethnic group placing all their eggs in one political basket. They must vest their aspirations as a group in one party, for to split the vote is simply to dilute their potential strength. The consequence:

The Republican and Democratic parties... have been the vehicles for the political advancement of quite different ethnic elements. The Republicans, by political necessity, became sensitive to the aspirations of the "old" immigrant elements / such as the Norwegian, Swedish, and Germans / who settled so largely on the farms. The Democrats, in turn, have been more alive to the aspirations of the "new" immigrant elements who crowded the teeming cities.¹

What especially deserves our attention in the preceding analysis is that in each case a political party has served as a means for a group to gain entry into an existing society. The Jews, the Irish, the Italian--and now the Negroes and the Puerto Ricans--have dreamt the American Dream. Those who, in each group, started to climb the social ladder and fought the discrimination

¹Lubell, op. cit., p. 78.

which kept them near the bottom, first cast off their ethnic distinctiveness, and then demanded that their acculturation be acknowledged and that they themselves be fully accepted into the society. Thus Lubell can claim that, "The emphasis on hyphenated candidates...is really an integral part of the Americanization process."¹

* * *

The question now arises: have the Acadians used the Liberal Party in the same way as successive immigrant groups have used the Republican Party and (in a later era) the Democratic Party? That is, have the Acadians put their political eggs in the Liberal basket in order to achieve equality with the British-Canadians of New Brunswick, but at the price of jeopardizing their cultural distinctiveness? In more general terms: is it possible for those who constitute an ethnic minority to use a single political party as an instrument of their social advance, while at the same time guaranteeing their cultural distinctiveness from the majority? The same question: can they preserve their distinctiveness only by participating in political affairs through the medium of at least two parties, thus preventing their ethnicity from taking on any political significance?

¹Ibid.

The Acadians: an ethnic minority

We need not recount here the story of the expulsion of the Acadians from Nova Scotia in 1755 and their gradual re-establishment elsewhere, many of them along the northern and eastern coastal regions of New Brunswick.¹ Suffice it to say that even after the re-appearance of the Acadians, a conscious effort was made by the British to exclude them from political and economic life; they were even shut out for a long time from the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church by the dominant Irish. Thus the present position of the Acadians is the result of desperate resistance against a long period of repression which, had the Acadians not lived for the most part in isolated farm and fishing settlements, might have extinguished them as a distinct cultural grouping. The chief instrument of their advance has been a birth-rate which during the past century has raised the proportion of French-origin New Brunswickers from one-in-five to two-in-five. The 1961 Census indicates that the Acadians constitute 39 per cent of the population of New Brunswick, and 44 per cent of that of Westmorland.

The concept of what constitutes a minority goes beyond the idea of numerical inferiority; it includes also

¹A résumé of this episode of British colonial history, and of the development of the Acadian community in New Brunswick, is contained in Hugh G. Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick ("Canadian Government Series"; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), pp. 21-39. There is a more complete account in Robert Rumilly, Histoire des Acadiens (2 vols.; Montreal: Fides, 1955).

the idea of subordinate status. The latter aspect of the Acadians' minority position in New Brunswick and Westmorland will concern us particularly.

The most tangible characteristic of the subordinate status of an ethnic group is that the members of the group are restricted in their choice of occupation; their ethnicity constitutes an impediment to social mobility. Associated with the fact that certain occupations are virtually closed to members of the ethnic group, is another index of subordinate status which is more difficult to measure, namely, lack of respect for members of the group, or what might be termed a sort of social ostracism, although the word may be too strong. To a very considerable extent, however, one's prestige in the society is a derivative of the status attaching to one's occupation and the income which is a direct correlate of it. For this reason we shall concentrate our attention on the accessibility for Acadians of high status occupations in the Church and the liberal professions, in business, and in government.

Those Acadians who have acquired positions of leadership within the Acadian community, and have achieved a relatively high-status position in the society as a whole, have generally done so through the Church or in the liberal professions. The first leaders of the Acadians were their priests, although in the first half of the nineteenth century even Acadian parishes were often assigned Irish or Scottish clergy; and it was not until 1910 that the

first Acadian bishop was appointed. It is easier for a person of an ethnic minority to enter the liberal professions--medicine, law, and teaching--than it is to gain a foothold in the business world because in the former case comparatively little capital is required and people often prefer to obtain medical or legal services from those of their own ethnic group. Moreover, in the educational sphere, bilingual schools and confessionality, which in New Brunswick is covert but real, create a heavy demand for Acadian teachers.

Another thing which has encouraged Acadians to enter the liberal professions and the Church is that these fields have afforded Acadians an opportunity to achieve positions of prominence or leadership without sacrificing their ethnic distinctiveness. This is especially so in the case of the Church and in education, because these aspects of social life have tended to reinforce the cultural distinctiveness of the Acadians from other New Brunswickers. To choose a career in education or the Church has been, in effect, an affirmation of one's nationality. The same could not be said of entering medicine or law, where one's work necessarily involves a far wider range of contacts with English-speaking non-Catholics; but if one has a practice with a predominantly Acadian clientele (as many do) at least it does not require a person to enter what is in effect an alien milieu to earn a living. In this respect there is an important difference between such

occupations and business or commercial life.

The industry and commerce of Moncton are dominated by English-speaking persons. To a certain extent this is due to Moncton's role as a distribution centre for goods manufactured elsewhere, mostly in central Canada. As industrial brochure published by the Moncton Board of Trade lists sixty-six national companies with sales offices and/or warehouses, which serve the Atlantic Provinces from Moncton; there are a further twenty-nine companies with offices in Moncton serving the immediate district. If, therefore, the commercial life of the city is dominated by those whose mother tongue is English, this is largely a reflection of the fact that most national companies are staffed at the top by English-Canadians.¹ The ownership and management of manufacturing enterprises also are almost wholly vested in English-Canadian hands. By way of evidence for this statement we may cite the testimony of an English-speaking informant whose work brought him into close contact with all major business concerns in Moncton. He supplied us with a list of thirty-eight manufacturers in the city, from which he was able to pick out only two firms which were owned by Acadians; together they employed fewer than thirty men.² In the service industries, retail

¹John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 73-96; 285-7.

²This fact is reflected in the composition of the Council of the Moncton Board of Trade. Of the 25 members

trade, and the construction industry the Acadians have fared slightly better, although (by our own observation) English firms predominate in these fields also. It is significant that in these industries comparatively little capital is required to set up a small business.

Probably the most telling index of the English control of business life in New Brunswick, and of the difficulty experienced by Acadians in entering this field, is the emigration of graduates of the School of Commerce at the Université de Moncton. I have no precise data on this matter, but a member of the university faculty in the social sciences told us that in the past few years substantially more than half the students of the Ecole de Commerce have left the province immediately upon graduation. Still others have been leaving within two or three years after they received their degrees. While there is reported to be a similar pattern among graduates of the English universities in the Maritimes, the percentages are noticeably lower, and some of those who leave do so as a sort of apprenticeship with national companies and return a few years later, either with the firm which

of the Council, only four have Acadian names. Similar evidence is contained in Jean Cadieux, Etude sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme dans la région de Moncton, N.B., Pour le compte de la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et biculturalisme [Canada] ([mimeographed], octobre 1965), pp. 58-67. Professor Cadieux asserts that the leadership, membership, and language of communication indicates English control not only of the Moncton Board of Trade, but also of the Moncton Junior Chamber of Commerce, the Rotary Club, and the Greater Moncton Community Chest.

originally hired them, or in senior positions in Maritime firms.¹ This sort of career-pattern is not generally available to Acadians. Many of those who leave go to French Canadian-controlled companies in Quebec. Whether or not they will ever return probably depends on the course of developments in New Brunswick. In the meantime, their departure makes it all the more difficult for the Acadians to acquire an important place in New Brunswick business circles.

Our discussion of the role of Acadians in government --through political parties, or in the public service-- will be deferred to a subsequent section of this chapter.

We cannot conclude even our very cursory description of the minority position of the Acadians without raising the question of ethnic discrimination. This complex and subtle problem is not one which we attempted to investigate because there would have been only slight prospects of discovering enough evidence to support an independent judgment on it. I can therefore do no more than report that a very large proportion of our Acadian interviewees alleged the existence of ethnic discrimination in hiring and promotions, while also acknowledging that it is now less prevalent than formerly.

Particularly for senior positions, the Orange Order

¹Interview with Professor Aurèle Young, Université de Moncton.

and the Masonic Order were alleged to have or to have had a very strong influence against the appointment of Acadians. Our inquiries of a few English-speaking respondents produced no information concerning the Orders, except that all had "heard of" them, tended to discount their present importance, and welcomed the waning of their influence; two respondents likened them to the Ku Klux Klan. One need not take this comparison literally to appreciate the fact that it confirms (even if in an exaggerated form) the accounts which we obtained from Acadians concerning the attitudes of Orangemen and Masons. It also suggests that militant anti-Catholicism is not now respectable.

Even if one discounts the sinister objectives and semi-violent methods suggested by the comparison with the KKK, the fact remains that the Lodges at one time encouraged and perhaps still encourage the intermingling of people who, simply because they have come to know each other in this way, would tend to pick their associates in business or government from other Lodge members. The result may still be almost as discriminatory as if a conscious effort were made to exclude those of French origin from certain positions; and when this fact is linked to the existence of secret ritual and (in the case of the Orangemen) extravagantly "loyalist" attitudes, the activities of the Orders may appear to be positively conspiratorial. I hasten to add that these comments are offered with some diffidence, because I do not profess to know

much about the Orders. It deserves emphasis that I neither allege nor deny that they have influence in business or government circles in New Brunswick. Nevertheless, even without this knowledge I feel justified in remarking that it is possible for them to perpetuate discrimination against the Acadians without being conspiratorial. Secondly, it is an easily-observable fact that many Acadians feel that they are discriminated against as a group, and that some of them blame the Orders for this.

The conviction that the Orange Order and the Masonic Order have exercised an anti-Acadian influence and have closed careers to them, even if the conviction is exaggerated, gave rise to a counter-organization amongst French-speaking New Brunswickers. We refer to the Ordre Jacques-Cartier. Officially the O.J.C. has been disbanded, although several Acadian respondents asserted that it still exists and is important. None of them, however, admitted to belonging to it. It was--or is--a secret organization, not only in its activities, but in its membership. Those who belong (I shall use the present tense, which may be read as the historical present if desired) are pledged to obey instructions from the Ordre regarding certain of their actions affecting French-Canadians. (It is not a purely New Brunswick organization.) The aim is to promote the advancement of French-Canadians as a group by controlling certain positions, and seeing that they are filled by members of the Ordre. Once a position has been cap-

tured, as it were, the occupant can use his influence under instructions from the Ordre, to promote the advancement of other members. One might describe the object of the O.J.C. ("La Patente," as it is more generally known) as being to create a sort of ratchet which assures that a position once held by a French-Canadian is not to be relinquished, while the holder of the position attempts to open up other posts for French-Canadians. The power of the Ordre derives from its influence on appointments, so that a person who seeks a post controlled by it is forced to join and to obey its instructions.

My references to the Orange Order, the Masons, and the Ordre Jacques Cartier are not intended as an assertion of their present or even their past influence. The important point is to note the existence of a widespread conviction amongst Acadians that they have been discriminated against, and that discrimination, though declining, still exists. Many Acadians tend to blame the Orangemen and Masons for this, and while it would be interesting to know to what extent their allegations are justified, it is sufficient for our present purposes to know that suspicion of the Orders exists. One response which this attitude has evoked has been to fight fire with fire; to set up a secret counter-organization, the Ordre Jacques Cartier. Again, an estimate of the influence of the Ordre--indeed, even positive and irrefutable evidence whether it has been disbanded or still exists--would be interesting to have,

but is not essential. We ought simply to keep the Ordre and its methods in mind, as an example of one type of response to subordinate status. In subsequent sections of the chapter we shall be considering other means of promoting the advancement of a minority ethnic group.

Finally, on the subject of the minority position of the Acadians, it is worth mentioning our own observation that Moncton had the appearance of being very much an English-speaking city, judging from street signs, language heard in stores, advertising, etc. One would scarcely guess that two of every five inhabitants of the city are French-speaking. The following comment seems to us to be just:

Moncton est encore une ville anglaise et anglicisante. Il y a à peine cinquante ans, parler français en public c'était risquer de se faire insulter et l'on raconte de multiples histoires de bagarres entre les anglophones de Moncton et les Acadiens des villages voisins de Dieppe et de Saint-Anselme qu'ils voulaient empêcher de parler leur langue....Ce qui a sauvé les Acadiens de Moncton, c'est précisément la position géographique de leur ville qui en fait le centre religieux de l'archidiocèse et le centre administratif des sociétés nationales acadiennes. La vie acadienne s'est maintenue dans leurs admirables paroisses fondées au prix de luttes héroïques, dans leurs groupements sociaux de plus importants, dans leur journal l'Evangeline, etc.¹

¹Ade Hubert, C.J.M., "Aperçu démographique du peuple acadien," reprinted from L'action nationale in Nos forces vives face à l'avenir, XIVe Congrès général des Acadiens (Moncton, N.B.: La Société Nationale des Acadiens, 1965), p. 77.

The Role of Voluntary Associations

There are a number of voluntary associations which have a specifically Acadian character. Chief among these is the Société Nationale des Acadiens, which includes in its objectives the following:

Mettre à la disposition du peuple acadien un organisme de coordination qui soit en mesure d'aider à formuler notre pensée nationale; à unir nos efforts en vue d'une action collective plus efficace; à servir de porte-parole autorisé à notre groupe ethnique.

Encourager l'amour de l'usage de la langue française et propager le respect dû à la foi de nos ancêtres ainsi qu'à nos institutions acadiennes et catholiques.

Enquêter sur les conditions de notre vie économique et sociale; faire connaître et apprécier les ressources et les institutions à la disposition de notre peuple; soutenir notre fierté nationale et développer un sentiment de sain patriotisme par l'étude de notre histoire et la participation de tous les Acadiens à nos oeuvres nationales.

1

Perhaps a better indication of the S.N.A.'s activities is the following list of permanent committees of the Société, excluding those concerned solely with organization: Affaires religieuses, Radio et Télévision, Activités culturelles et françaises, Bourses aux minorités, Vigilance et promotion. These are self-explanatory, except the last, about which the Secretary of the S.N.A.

¹Société Nationale des Acadiens, "Statuts et règlements," Nos forces vives face à l'avenir, pp. 123-4.

said in his report of activities (1960-5):

, Ce comité est peut-être l'un des plus importants de notre société. Les injustices faites aux nôtres dans le fonctionnarisme surtout, sont souvent révoltantes. Il faut donc être toujours aux aguets. Les requêtes fructueuses, les protestations justifiées et les autres démarches de ce comité sont trop nombreuses pour être énumérées ici.¹

In a word, the aim of the Société Nationale des Acadiens is to preserve a minority culture. One can see something of the interests of its members in the following incident. At the 1965 Congrès of the S.N.A., participants were asked to indicate which of four study committees they wished to attend when the Congrès was not in plenary session. Their choices were:

Secteur Education	27 participants
Secteur Visage Française en Acadie	12 participants
Secteur Socio-Economique	-14 participants
Secteur Politique	6 participants

At the Congrès there was, by our own observation, a very heavy predominance of clergy and professional men. Unfortunately we have no data on the occupations of the members or of the executive of the S.N.A., but it is possible to say with confidence that far fewer of them, and far fewer of the leaders of the Acadian community in general, are drawn from business circles than would be the

¹Ibid., p. 111.

case in associations (except certain explicitly professional associations) in English Canada.

There are several other organizations, apart from the Société Nationale des Acadiens, which are concerned with the preservation of the French culture in New Brunswick or in the Maritimes generally. Among these are: l'Association Acadienne d'Education, l'Association des Instituteurs Acadiens, and the French section of the New Brunswick Home and School Association, the Foyers-Ecoles.

Of major importance is the daily newspaper, l'Évangéline, which is published in Moncton. In a province where the important English-language newspapers are concentrated in the hands of two individuals,¹ l'Évangéline has special importance as a source of information and comment beyond the fact that it is printed in the Acadians' mother tongue. L'Évangéline was, for example, the only daily newspaper in the province to support the Robichaud Government's "Program for Equal Opportunity," a program of great importance to Acadians and also to some other groups in the province.² The newspaper is also a steady campaigner for Acadian representation in public office (elective and appointive), for separate schools, language rights, and other aspects of Acadian rights.

¹The papers in Saint John and in Moncton are controlled by the Saint John industrialist K.C. Irving. The Fredericton Gleaner is independent, but staunchly British.

²The Program is referred to in greater detail, below.

Concerning the influence of the Church hierarchy on its policies, it may be noted that the paper is a fusion of two weeklies which were purchased in 1944 after a financial campaign sponsored by the Archbishop of Moncton. Ownership was vested in a firm incorporated for the purpose, L'Imprimerie Acadienne Limitée, and the bishops announced the creation of, "Un journal indépendant, 'en dehors et au-dessus de toute politique de parti', et catholique, administré, rédigé et publié par les laïcs, mais sous la surveillance épiscopale dans les questions touchant, de près ou de loin, la foi et la morale."¹ Thus L'Evangéline was established as a newspaper which, although not directly controlled by the Church, was to be definitely of Catholic inspiration. It was suggested to us by a few interviewees that the paper is now less influenced by the hierarchy than formerly it was, and this opinion is reinforced by the recent transfer of ownership to the Société de Gestion Atlantique, which is referred to below. Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to report further on this question since no systematic analysis of the content of the paper was made.

Although the Société Nationale des Acadiens and other Acadian associations have adopted an essentially protective stance to guard against cultural assimilation, this attitude is being supplemented and perhaps in some minds

¹Rumilly, Robert: Histoire des Acadiens, v.2, p. 1004.

surpassed by a desire to promote the advancement of the Acadians as a people rather than to secure the defence of their culture from "outside enemies."¹ This change in attitude is suggested, for instance, in the work of the S.N.A.'s Comité de Vigilance et de Promotion, which seeks to ensure that Acadians get their due share of senior positions in the public service. The major indication of the new attitudes, however, is a very clear desire on the part of many Acadian leaders to play a greater role in economic affairs, and to encourage Acadians generally to do likewise. An important instrument of the economic advance of the Acadians is the Société l'Assomption.² It was initially set up as a mutual aid and benevolent association, and subsequently moved into the insurance field and provided capital for bodies such as schools and hospitals. It is now a financial institution of some importance, possessing assets of more than \$25,000,000; it acts through its affiliate the Société de Gestion Atlantique, as a holding company for Acadian-owned and Acadian-managed business enterprises. As Dr. Leon Richard,

¹We shall refer to the character of Acadian and French-Canadian nationalisms in a subsequent section. The distinction, both here and in the fuller treatment below, between defensive nationalism and a form of nationalism which seeks the advancement (or épanouissement) of the cultural group, is based largely on the article by Jean-Marc Leger, "French-Canadian Nationalism," University of Toronto Quarterly, v. 27, 1958.

²Known, until 1957, as La Société Mutuelle l'Assomption.

the President of the Société Nationale des Acadiens remarked in 1965, with reference to the Société l'Assomption:

Le rôle qu'elle peut maintenant jouer par la Compagnie / sic_ / de Gestion Atlantique va certainement déboucher sur des réalisations économiques qui aideront encore davantage les nôtres à sortir du marasme économique qui est notre partage depuis si longtemps.... La Société de Gestion Atlantique qui a pris naissance depuis le dernier congrès / de la Société Nationale des Acadiens, 1960_ /, a maintenant un actif de \$200,000.00 et un capital autorisé de deux millions. Etant une société filiale de la Société l'Assomption, elle a aussi ses propres filiales: à savoir la Compagnie de Finance Bonaccord et les Immeubles Bonaccord Ltée. Voilà donc un autre outil précieux qui a pour but l'aide aux nouvelles industries et commerces de la population acadienne.

Dr. Richard went on to remark, concerning the general economic position of the Acadians:

Il y a bien aussi certaines industries privées qui progressent, mais elles ne sont pas assez nombreuses. Il y va un peu du caractère de l'Acadien de ne pas être porté à se lancer dans le risque financier. Nous ne comprenons pas encore que pour contrôler il faut posséder, et pour posséder il faut risquer. Il faut d'abord avoir le désir de contrôler si l'on veut risquer et réussir. Il faut avoir foi en soi-même et dans ses concitoyens et s'atteler à la tâche avec beaucoup de courage et de persévérance! ¹

This statement is interesting as much for its encouragement to Acadians to enter business and commercial life,

¹Nos forces vives face à l'avenir, pp. 23-4.

as it is for its acknowledgement of the weakness of Acadian representation in this sphere.

Apart from the Société l'Assomption, the only large source of capital in Acadian hands comes from the Caisses Populaires (credit unions), which have a collective capital of over twenty million.¹ The Caisses Populaires generally loan their money to individuals, more on the basis of their character than on their collateral: and it is asserted that they have done much to improve the position of farmers and fishermen who need capital to finance their operations. They are not in a position, however, to loan money in amounts large enough to establish substantial business enterprises. Of these, there are very few in Acadian hands.

There are two other organizations which deserve mention for their role in seeking the economic betterment of the Acadians. These are the Commission Acadienne d'Orientation Socio-Economique and the three Acadian sub-federations in the New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture, one of which is the Fédération Agricole Française de l'Archidiocèse de Moncton.² The Commission and the Federations are not by any means identical organizations, but their objectives are similar: the improvement of

¹Ibid.

²Of the other two, one is centred in Bathurst and the other in Edmunston.

living conditions and the enrichment of social life in rural areas inhabited by Acadians.

One of the principal concerns of the Commission Acadienne d'Orientation Socio-Economique is the planning and implementation of an A.R.D.A. program in Acadian areas of the Maritimes (not only New Brunswick).¹ A plan for a study of the territory, including regions within the three provinces, has been drawn up. It was discussed in committee at the 1965 Congrès of the Société Nationale and was approved by the Congrès, but the prospects for its implementation are most uncertain. One reason for the uncertainty is the insistence that the study should be carried out by people who are familiar with the milieu, i.e. by Acadians rather than by (as was initially proposed by a member of the federal A.R.D.A. staff) a group of geographers, economists, and sociologists from the Université de Montreal. This insistence on Acadian rather than Quebec management of the project prejudices the chance of its success because of the great scarcity of Acadians who are trained in these fields.

Equally or more important, however, is the apparent unresponsiveness of the New Brunswick government. Some of those involved in the attempt to initiate an A.R.D.A. project, including one member of the executive of the

¹The Commission consists of twenty-three members, drawn from academic institutions and Acadian organizations, and also of regional representatives.

Commission, thought it unlikely that the project would be proceeded with. One suggested reason for this was that the Robichaud Government was unwilling to sponsor a project which was openly declared to be for the benefit of the Acadians as such; it would be more acceptable politically to undertake a program which, if it favoured one ethnic group more than another, did so only incidentally --as for instance, if the project were for rural re-development generally. In this case it would also help the poor areas which are inhabited by English-speaking people.

In spite of the apparent coolness of the provincial government towards an Acadian A.R.D.A. program, however, work is proceeding in the setting up of local committees to press for and (it is hoped) to implement a project. A general meeting of those interested was held in the Archdiocese of Moncton in the autumn of 1965, and a provisional committee was established. The task of the provisional committee was to propose a structure for a diocesan A.R.D.A. committee. It reported to a second general meeting in April, 1966, to which the public was invited as well as representatives from the Fédération Agricole, the cooperatives, breeders' and producers' associations, and the Caisses Populaires. No representatives from the municipalities or from the Chambers of Commerce were invited, as it had been decided by the provisional committee not to include any organizations

of a purely local character. (It is interesting that the Chambers of Commerce were viewed in this light.) At the meeting, a permanent executive of twenty-five was elected, and charged with the task of setting up parish committees which, by contrast with the diocesan committee, will include representatives from local associations--Chambers of Commerce, municipal councils, local Caisses Populaires, Canadian Legion, etc. These local committees were in the process of formation during the summer of 1966, at which time we left the riding.

The three Acadian sub-federations in the New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture also are concerned with the improvement in rural living standards amongst Acadians. As we have already pointed out, the activities of the Fédération Agricole Française de l'Archidiocèse de Moncton are similar to those of the Westmorland-Albert-Kent (English) sub-federation (W.A.K.E.). Our chief interest, therefore, in the Fédération Agricole is simply to note its existence as a separate body, its territory overlapping the "W.A.K.E." territory, so that the line of demarcation between them is linguistic rather than geographical. Informants on both sides stressed that there are no policy differences or other grounds for ill-will separating them; relations are good, but there is little communication between them except when the Federation of Agriculture meets

in provincial convention each year.¹

The voluntary associations which we have described, all of which have a specifically Acadian character, may be presumed to play an important role in developing leaders of the Acadian community. This is most obvious in the case of the Commission Acadienne d'Orientation Socio-Economique, which has the creation of indigenous leaders (through A.R.D.A.) as one of its principal objectives; but this is a latent if not a manifest function of other associations as well. Voluntary associations are important in developing Acadian leaders simply because they provide the opportunity for Acadians to mingle with each other and to co-operate for the achievement of common goals--and to do so in their own language.

The situation is quite different from that which prevails in voluntary associations in which it is not possible to create separate Acadian and English sections. In these associations, no Acadian can achieve positions of leadership unless he is capable of making his contribution to the organization in a language which is not his own. We are particularly struck by this fact in our observations of the trade union movement. Union business, as we have already noted, is necessarily conducted in English,

¹There are no other areas of the province where two sub-federations within the Federation of Agriculture overlap territorially. The Bathurst and the Edmundston sub-federations are in areas where there are scarcely any English-speaking farmers.

because there is no question of having meetings in French as long as there are any non-French-language persons present.¹ The only exception to this rule in the Moncton area, so far as we know, is a union of operating employees at the Hotel Dieu l'Assomption. Of five Acadian union leaders whom we interviewed, four could not have been identified by their speech as non-English.

The simple fact is that English predominates in organizations with mixed English and Acadian membership. There is substantial evidence for this statement in Jean Cadieux' Etude sur le bilinguisme et biculturalisme dans la région de Moncton, N.-B.² To this study by Professor Cadieux we would add the following: whereas he stressed that few organizations are genuinely bilingual in character, it should also be emphasized that some Acadians do participate in organizations which have a strong English majority. For example, in 1966 the president of the Moncton Board of Trade was an Acadian. Nevertheless-- and this is the essential point--when an Acadian partic-

¹Professor Thorburn remarks, "...the term 'bilingual' in New Brunswick has developed a peculiar meaning. It refers to a person who is of French origin and speaks both French and English. When one wishes to designate an English-speaking person who can speak French, this fact needs a sentence or two of explanation; the term 'bilingual' will not do." Hugh Thorburn, The Political Participation of the French-Speaking Population of New Brunswick, A Report prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism [Canada / mimeographed /, November 1965), p. 75.

²Op. cit.; see especially pp. 58-70.

ipates in a mixed or predominantly English organization, he does so on terms set by the majority, that is, in English. The number of cases of English participation in predominantly French-language associations is much smaller, and it is noteworthy that the organizations in this category listed by Professor Cadieux are social-fraternal-charitable in nature. By contrast, civic bodies and associations relating to economic affairs are either mixed or predominately English.

Perhaps our comments about English dominance of associations with mixed membership will seem obvious. It is important, however, to mention this fact explicitly, because it suggests two questions, both of which are relevant to the succeeding section of this chapter. They are:

- (1) Do Acadians participate in political parties on the same apparently unequal basis as they participate in voluntary associations which are mixed in ethnic composition?
- (2) Can any action be taken by political parties or by a government which will fundamentally alter the position of an ethnic minority? That is, are there any political means by which an ethnic minority can escape from or attenuate its subordinate status in relation to the majority--or to do so, must it abandon its cultural distinctiveness?

Promotion of Ethnic Group Interests through Political Parties

At the outset of this chapter it was stated that the Acadians as a group are identified with the Liberal Party.

This statement requires substantiation before we can properly discuss whether, and how, an ethnic minority can use political means of advancing their interests as a distinct cultural grouping.

Professor Thorburn has convincingly demonstrated the tendency of Acadians to support the Liberal Party rather than the Conservatives. He writes:

The French-speaking minority has been voting en bloc from the time of Confederation and has always supported the party which is less favoured by the English-speaking majority. This divergence reached its first peak in the conscription election of 1917, and its second in the depression election of 1935. Since then, the divergences have diminished. As the French-speaking group approaches the English in numbers, it perhaps no longer feels the need to stand so firmly together to defend its interests. ¹

The correlation of ethnic affiliation and voting behaviour in New Brunswick is demonstrated not only in the higher Liberal vote in predominantly Acadian counties, but is still more strikingly revealed in Professor Thorburn's analysis of election results in the French and the ethnically-mixed counties of the province, including Westmorland. There is clear evidence that in provincial elections, where there are multi-member constituencies,

¹Thorburn, The Political Participation of the French-Speaking Population of New Brunswick, pp. 55, 59 (intervening pages contain tables). Supporting data for this statement are contained on pp. 53-66.

"Acadians tend to vote the (Liberal) ticket, and the English-speaking people, especially the Protestants, tend to favour English-speaking candidates."¹ Voting statistics by parish in Westmorland also strongly support this conclusion.²

The Acadians' tendency to support the Liberal Party is a feature of New Brunswick politics which was acknowledged by all our interviewees. The most commonly offered explanation of this fact was that the Liberals have given greater prominence to the Acadians within their own ranks than have the Conservatives, and this in turn has tended to attract the support of Acadian voters. Since Louis Robichaud's accession to the Premiership, heading a Government of which half the ministers are French-speaking and in which a majority of the important departments are in Acadian hands, the image of the Liberal Party as the party which has accorded Acadians their due place in the government of the province has been given added credibility. Once such a view became widespread--several informants attributed its inception to Laurier's career--bloc support for the party had a tendency to reinforce itself over time. Why? Because Acadians seeking a political career tended to do so through the party which had

¹Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick, p. 81.

²Ibid., pp. 81-2.

greater support amongst their own ethnic group; in this way Acadians became a more important element in the party; and this in turn reinforced the initial party preference of the ordinary Acadian voter.

In sum, the reasons given us to explain Acadian support for the Liberal Party emphasized personalities rather than policies.¹ This is true not only of the mass of Acadian voters (as evidenced by voting statistics) but also of the leaders of the Acadian community. Acadians within the Conservative Party whom we interviewed admitted that the members of the "select" Acadian clubs in Moncton (Richelieu, Beauséjour) and the leaders of the Société Nationale are almost all Liberals, many of them professing their affiliation publicly.

There appears, however, to be a degree of uneasiness amongst some Acadian leaders about the relationship (although entirely unofficial) between themselves and the Liberal Party. One informant, a Conservative who had criticized certain aspects of the Robichaud Government's Program for Equal Opportunity,² said that although some Acadians called his remarks treasonous, a few Acadian

¹This led us, during the course of field research, to ask whether as a rule Acadians in politics are simply seeking their own personal advancement in the society, and using a political party, normally the Liberals, as a ladder. It is in this way that the questions with which this chapter are concerned first suggested themselves to us.

²The Program tends to favour Acadians since they inhabit some of the poorer parts of the province.

leaders privately congratulated him for his criticisms on the grounds that the Acadians were becoming too closely associated with the Liberal Party. Another informant, also a Conservative and a member of the executive of the Société Nationale, said that he suspected his nomination to the latter position was partly motivated by a desire on the part of Acadian leaders to dissociate the S.N.A. from the Liberal Party, since many of the leaders of the S.N.A. are active Liberals.

The greater Acadian support for the Liberals than for the Conservatives leads one to ask whether the influence they wield within the parties is commensurate with the degree of support they accord to each. This is quite likely to be the case, but not necessarily. For it is possible that, as one of our informants (himself a Liberal of French origin) asserted, the Acadians have little political influence because there are too few of them in the Conservative Party, and the Liberal Party is too sure of their support to be swayed by their demands. This again raises the question whether the Liberal Party has helped or can help the Acadians as a group, or whether it simply serves the personal interests of individuals, many of whom happen to be Acadians, who are seeking an entry into positions in New Brunswick. We shall look at the position of the Acadians, first in the Conservative Party and then in the Liberal Party.

There is substantial evidence, although of an im-

pressionistic nature, that Acadians wield little influence within the Conservative Party, and that those Acadians who support it do so for reasons unrelated to the party's role in furthering the interests of the Acadian people. On the first point, we shall simply quote the testimony of some of our interviewees:

Ce sont les Anglais qui mènent...cela s'explique peut-être par la caisse du parti fournie principalement par les Anglais.

Le contrôle est de prédominance anglaise ...Les relations sont excellentes, mais nous ne sommes pas assez nombreux.

Le parti conservateur de Nouveau-Brunswick devient de plus en plus anglais ...Je ne pouvais pas dire qu'il y a une position anti-française mais malgré ça je le pense...Le parti provincial ignore le fait français, non intentionnellement, mais ils sont un petit groupe du Saint-John River qui ignore le français parce qu'ils s'entendent bien entre eux.

On ne reconnaît pas assez le fait français à la direction du parti conservateur. Il lui arrivera comme dans mon cas de pouvoir accéder à l'exécutif du comté, mais il serait rare d'accéder aux véritables postes de direction.

Another respondent said that there exists in the Conservative Party a certain Orange-Mason element, centred in the Saint John River valley, which is not consciously anti-French but which nevertheless makes little effort to co-operate with the Acadians in the Party, and are too far removed geographically from them to understand or appreciate them. Of the six Conservatives of French origin

whom we interviewed, only one denied that Acadians occupy an inferior or subordinate position in the Party. He said: "A l'intérieur du parti conservateur il n'y a pas de difficulté; ils font même effort à y établir le 'British Fair Play'."

One wonders, in view of the feeling which apparently exists amongst Conservatives of Acadian origin, what it is that attracts them to the Party. Naturally it is impossible to answer this question adequately, even for each case individually; but it is significant that of the five French-origin Conservatives whom we questioned on the political affiliation of their families, all were sons of Conservative Members or organizers. One said he had simply always been interested; another that politics is a matter of taste, one does not join a party because of ideas; a third one said, "On y rencontre des gens intéressants."

It is also important that all French-origin Conservatives we interviewed were either professionals or proprietors of small businesses; and several of them expressed their hostility to government intervention in the affairs of private enterprise. One said: "Le parti conservateur représente plus la masse des commerçants; ils favourisent et aident l'entreprise privée, contrairement aux socialistes qui aident [les gens?] directement et font ainsi des parasites." Another, who said he "detested" politics, explained his participation this way: "Me mêler de politique m'a aidé pour mon commerce." And finally,

another informant: "Je suis contre toute forme de contrôle de l'état; les Libéraux sont socialistes.... Le parti conservateur est un parti de gens plus indépendant, financièrement à l'aise; les gens du parti conservateur sont des cigars-smoker, des gros bonnets indépendants." He added: "Je suis conservateur parce que j'espère devenir juge."

In sum: on the basis of the impressionistic evidence which I have just adduced, it appears that most Acadians who support the Conservative Party do so either because they have chosen it as an instrument of their personal advancement, or because they hope it will preserve the private-enterprise economy. Our interviewees acknowledged that Acadians generally give their allegiance to the Liberal Party but they tended to attribute this to the establishment of traditional voting patterns, which have been perpetuated by the tendency of Acadian voters to support the party in which their own ethnic group is more prominently represented. They were either uninterested in the possible role of political parties in promoting the interests of Acadians as a group, or perhaps were simply not accustomed to thinking of parties in this way. The latter possibility seems to be the more likely explanation, since our interviewees generally seemed to think of parties as a combination of personal rather than group interests. Thus, in their minds, the fact that there are more Acadians in the Liberal Party than in the Conservative Party does

not imply that the Liberals have done more to help Acadians as a group.

Indeed, Acadian Conservatives might have drawn attention to the fact that in Westmorland County it was the Conservatives who first adopted the practice of giving equal representation to Acadians and non-Acadians. In 1948 the Conservatives nominated two French-speaking Catholics among their four candidates for M.L.A. from "the county" (i.e., the area outside Moncton); this initiative was followed only reluctantly by the Liberals in 1952, and has been standard practice for both parties since that time.¹ Moreover, since our departure from Westmorland, a significant incident has occurred. On March 30, 1967, the Conservative leader placed before the legislature a motion to recognize French as an official language in New Brunswick. Rather paradoxically, the motion was opposed by the Acadian Premier, Louis Robichaud. He argued that neither language had official status in New Brunswick by law; that both were recognized in practice; that the important thing was to extend the area of application of language rights; and that the Conservative motion was therefore of little meaning.² More revealingly, perhaps, in view of his electoral dependence on English votes, Robichaud said that the motion was unfair to the English-speaking population, since English was not mentioned in the resolution.

¹Thorburn, Politics in New Brunswick, p. 80; the reluctance of the Liberals to nominate two French-speaking Catholics instead of one (balancing the ticket with one English-speaking Catholic and the customary two English-speaking Protestants) was reported to me by Professor Thorburn in private conversation.

²The Telegraph-Journal (Saint John, N.B.), March 31, 1967, pp. 1, 7. Le Devoir (Montreal), 13 avril, 1967, p. 4.

But he did not take the obvious step of amending the motion as necessary and securing, presumably, its unanimous passage.

It is interesting that the Acadians of Liberal allegiance whom we interviewed generally argued that their party is more favourable to Acadians simply because they have strong representation within the party--that is, they stressed the significance of a fact which the Conservatives acknowledged but the importance of which they depreciated. One Liberal said: "Le Parti libéral a toujours été le meilleur parti pour la masse; ce parti s'est toujours occupé de la chose française....Les vieux disent: 'On ne peut être catholique et être conservateur.'" Another, whose father was an active Conservative, explained his conversion to the Liberal Party in this way: "Il y avait plus de Français (dans le Parti libéral) et on pouvait plus facilement les aider; je suis convaincu que les libéraux, à cause de nos membres élus, sont plus penchés vers nous que les conservateurs." On the other hand, the same informant saw a continuous struggle within the party to prevent the English from taking the important positions for themselves: "Quand vient une réunion [de l'association du comté] il faut nous assurer que tous nos membres y viennent, parce que les Canadiens anglais essaieront d'y mettre leurs hommes....Il faut surveiller tant les protestants que les Irlandais." It may well be that the price of equity is eternal vigilance; but most Acadian Liberals stressed that their party opens the door to

Acadians, not that they have to knock to get in.

Do Acadians participate in political parties on the same apparently unequal basis as they participate in voluntary associations which are mixed in ethnic composition? Our evidence relating to the Conservative Party points strongly to the conclusion that English-speaking New Brunswickers dominate that party. In the case of the Liberals, the answer must be more equivocal. The careers of many Acadians, and most prominently that of Louis Robichaud, have demonstrated that the highest posts in the Liberal Party and hence in the province are open to Acadians. Nevertheless, the fact remains that they cannot aspire to positions of even only middling importance unless they are capable of performing in English the duties which such positions involve. In this respect, the situation is exactly analagous to that in voluntary associations of mixed or predominantly English membership. It could not be otherwise in a province where French is not an official language, and where, accordingly, the M.L.A.'s legislative business requires substantial fluency in English. Perhaps to an even greater degree the necessity of being fluent in English is dictated by the fact that New Brunswick is a province where many people--ordinary voters, members of the legislature, civil servants, businessmen: in short, the people with whom a politician has to deal--cannot speak French. If, through the Liberal Party or by other means, a greater number of Acadians acquire positions

of power in the province, the present one-sided kind of bilingualism which one finds in New Brunswick may be superseded by a reciprocal bilingualism. But such a change, if it occurs, cannot be accomplished by a simple change in government, and it is well to recognize the limits of effective political action as well as its possibilities. Thus one could not claim, even though Acadians hold many of the key positions in the Liberal Party, that their participation in the party or in the government is on a basis of full equality with the English-speaking Liberals.

The perhaps banal observation that Acadians in public life in New Brunswick have to learn English must not be allowed to draw our attention away from the study of other possible means by which political parties may be able to improve the position of the Acadian minority. The best starting-point for such a study is undoubtedly the assertion by many Liberal activists that their party helps Acadians simply by virtue of the fact that it has demonstrated its willingness to place Acadians in the most senior positions in the party.

Our evaluation of what the Liberals have done and may do for the Acadians will be clarified by the following remarks by John Porter:

A distinction has been made between "behavioural assimilation" and "structural assimilation." The first means the extent to which the minority group has absorbed the cultural patterns of the "host" society and even perhaps had an

effect on it. Structural assimilation means the process by which ethnic groups have become distributed in the institutional structure of the receiving society, and in particular have assumed roles in general civic life. As a group of Canadian writers has pointed out, structural assimilation exists when ethnic origin is not a relevant attribute in the allocation of people to positions in the social system or in the distribution of rights. The establishment of fair employment and fair accommodation practices legislation in some Canadian industries and in some provinces is an effort to achieve some degree of structural assimilation.

Structural assimilation, no doubt, leads in time to behavioural assimilation. At least differences in patterns of living between various ethnic groups will be reduced. There are some grounds for the view, although writers on the subject are confused on the point, that structural assimilation is incompatible with continued ethnic pluralism. ¹

We do not expect to be any less confused than other writers have been on the question of whether structural assimilation is incompatible with continued ethnic pluralism. The distinction between behavioural and structural assimilation, however, is essential to our analysis of the role of political parties in promoting the interests of minority ethnic groups--in the present case, the Acadians. Clearly the answer which most Acadian Liberals gave to the question

¹Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, p. 72. Mr. William Irvine has pointed out, in this connection, that, "It is equally reasonable to see behavioural assimilation preceding structural assimilation. A venu is one who has assimilated the dominant behaviour and attitudes in order to obtain structural preferment. People in business or in society tend to bring into their groups those with whom they feel comfortable (i.e. the behaviourally assimilated). I suspect a feedback process occurs between the two." (From correspondence with the author.)

of what their party was doing to help the Acadians stressed the role of the party in facilitating their own structural assimilation into the dominantly British "host" society of New Brunswick. What is not so clear is whether this can be accomplished without destroying the cultural distinctiveness of their own group, the Acadians. In order to discuss this question we shall have to be a little more precise about the different ways in which a government may serve the interests of a minority ethnic group.

For purposes of analysis, it will be convenient to examine four categories of ways in which a government may serve the interests of a minority ethnic group:

- (1) Avoidance of discrimination in the exercise of administrative powers affecting individuals or individual firms or other organizations;
- (2) Fair treatment of groups or areas in which there are heavy concentrations of the ethnic group (no explicit recognition of ethnic differences);
- (3) Provision of equal services to the ethnic group, with recognition of the linguistic or confessional distinctiveness of the group.
- (4) Establishment or protection of minority rights by legal or constitutional guarantees.

Of these four categories, the first is least likely to provoke the mobilization of the majority against the ethnic minority, and the last is most likely to do so. This is a simple reflection of the fact that with each category (going from one to four) the ethnic cleavage, should controversy arise, becomes increasingly obvious.

Tactically speaking, therefore, an ethnic minority must seek to avoid provoking controversy on matters related to the promotion of its interests; and if controversy does arise, then it must obscure the ethnic cleavage and attempt to weather the storm by stressing the non-ethnic aspects of the issue. In respect of issues in categories three and four, it is virtually impossible to do this. Thus what might be called the "one-party tactic"--that is, the concentration of the political resources of the ethnic minority into one party--cannot be used in relation to objects which are likely to provoke controversy along ethnic lines. To do so would simply risk mobilizing the majority against the minority. One may conclude that the one-party tactic is too dangerous to be workable in relation to objects in categories three and four; and even for objects in category two it incurs some dangers. This argument will be further developed in the remainder of the chapter.

We are now in a position to assess the effectiveness of the one-party tactic in respect of the dual objectives of promoting structural assimilation and protecting against behavioural assimilation. It will be observed that the avoidance of discrimination against an ethnic minority--category one, above--tends towards its structural assimilation, but that it does nothing to guard against behavioural assimilation. Legislative protection of minority rights, on the other hand, is designed to

prevent behavioural assimilation, but does little or nothing to encourage structural assimilation. In short, the four categories in our schema are arranged in order of decreasing effectiveness in promoting structural assimilation, and of increasing effectiveness in protecting against behavioural assimilation.¹ Furthermore, as we have already noted, they are arranged in order of decreasing appropriateness in employing the one-party tactic. Thus the one-party tactic is most unlikely to be of value in protecting against the behavioural assimilation of an ethnic minority.

The whole argument may be summarized as follows:
The one-party tactic is inappropriate in relation to objectives which are likely to engender political controversy along ethnic lines; consequently, the more ethnically-specific the demands--i.e. the more they are directed to halting behavioural assimilation--the less likely they are to be realized by employing the one-party tactic.

Let us now look at each of the four ways in which a government may serve the interests of an ethnic minority.

¹I do not mean to imply that any governmental action which contributes to one objective damages pro tanto the likelihood of achieving the other objective; indeed, categories two and three contribute in some measure to both objectives. This theme will be taken up again when we discuss each of the four categories separately. In the meantime the reader should understand that I do not mean to say that promotion of structural assimilation cannot proceed without incurring behavioural assimilation --I simply do not know about this--nor do I mean to say that measures which protect an ethnic minority against behavioural assimilation block the road to structural assimilation.

First:

Avoidance of discrimination in the exercise of administrative powers affecting individuals or individual firms or other organizations.

Examples of such administrative powers are: hiring personnel for government work (i.e. casual employment), hiring and promotions within the civil service, purchasing government supplies or awarding government contracts, granting subsidies, loans, or tax concessions to private firms, distributing social assistance payments, and the making of grants to semi-public bodies such as recreational associations (which often are organized on ethnic lines). All these powers can be exercised either on a discretionary basis, in which case political parties play an important role in the administrative process, or else on an ostensibly non-discretionary basis, in which case a bureaucratic civil service performs these functions (except hiring and promotions within the service itself, which may be handled by a non-partisan civil service commission). The question therefore arises: Is the avoidance of discrimination in the performance of these functions more likely to be realized through a non-partisan bureaucracy or through political parties, i.e. by patronage? On this point we obtained an unequivocal answer from several Acadian, Liberal, respondents: without patronage, Acadians would find it much more difficult to obtain fair treatment from the government in its administrative

actions.¹ This view might be rephrased: patronage is an important mechanism for accomplishing the structural assimilation of the Acadians in New Brunswick.

The following two statements are the clearest expression of the view that patronage is important in overcoming discrimination against Acadians in hiring and contracts:

Le patronage est essentiel / pour le relèvement économique des Acadiens_/; on n'arrivera pas à l'éliminer. Ouvrant les contrats / pour les travaux publiques_/ publiquement, ce qui arrive pour nous--on n'a pas de gros entrepreneurs--est que deux ou trois gros entrepreneurs / anglophones_/ font ce qu'ils veulent.

On peut plus facilement placer les Français au provincial, par les positions ouvertes, qu'au fédéral....Nous y arrivons à aider les Français, en voyant à ce que les positions aillent à des Français.

These statements in defence of patronage derive from the conviction that the civil service as at present constituted is prejudiced against Acadians. The feeling that the civil service, particularly in the upper ranks, is "franc-maçon,

¹We did not ask interviewees directly about the role of patronage in serving the interests of the Acadians, because at the time of our field research I had not formulated the hypotheses which we are now discussing. Our information on this point is, therefore, sketchy; but the statements which we obtained concerning the importance of patronage are correspondingly more convincing, since several interviewees themselves suggested or alluded to this idea without being prodded by our questions.

anglais"¹ caused one informant to argue that it has too much power in the province: "Le seul moyen pour nous Acadiens d'avoir quelque porte [aux postes de pouvoir] est par les jeux politiques." Another respondent reported an incident which may be taken as an example of this. Although we were unable to confirm his story from other sources, we have every reason to accept its reliability. The incident involved a senior civil service post, for which an Acadian who was then working in Quebec had made application. The other candidates, all of them English-speaking, were informed of the date of the examination, but not so the Acadian. On hearing of this, the Cabinet or certain individual ministers--I am unclear on this point--intervened through one of the members of the Civil Service Commission to have the examination annulled. A new examination was to be held, at which the Acadian could be present. Our informant stressed that English-speaking Liberals are very sympathetic to Acadian requests--certainly more so than the civil service. He also remarked that since the appointment of an Acadian to the Civil Service Commission, it has been much easier to help the Acadians in obtaining positions in the civil service. He

¹There is substantial evidence confirming at least the latter part of this allegation. See Hugh G. Thorburn, Ethnic Participation and Language Use in the Public Service of New Brunswick, A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism [Canada] (/ mimeographed / February 1966), Chapter 2.

implied that the problem is increasingly becoming one of scarcity of qualified personnel rather than one of discrimination against Acadian applicants, when he said: "Pour les Acadiens, c'est surtout une question d'éducation et c'est là que nous nous forçons." (By "nous" he meant the Liberal party in general; he was one of the comparatively few respondents who emphasized a general aspect of the policy of the government in meeting the needs of the Acadian population, rather than individual administrative actions.)

The feeling amongst Acadians that discrimination against them has existed and to some extent still exists, and the natural desire to overcome such discrimination, goes a long way to explain the concentration of political resources in one party, the Liberals. We have referred to this, above, as the "one-party tactic"; we use the term to mean the tendency for Acadians who are seeking political careers to do so through the Liberal Party, and the pattern of bloc voting which since 1900 has favoured the Liberals.

Naturally it would be safer for the Acadians not to rely excessively on one party, since it leaves them in a very vulnerable position when that party is out of office. On the other hand, if they were to participate equally in both parties, they might lack the numbers to exercise much influence in either. Throughout their history the Acadians have had only very limited political resources, for in spite of their numbers (now a proportion of two in five in

the province), as a group they have suffered from a scarcity of capable leaders due to lower educational standards, and other factors, especially the lack of private wealth. Thus, of four important components of political power - leadership, public interest in and understanding of political affairs, wealth, and numbers - the Acadians have been only moderately well endowed with one and seriously lacking in three others. In such a situation, the best tactic is to avoid diluting the political resources available to them. By concentrating their political resources in one party, and forming an increasingly powerful bloc in it, the Acadians have been able to acquire for members of their group some of the most important positions in the province. Acadian firms have been able to obtain government contracts, and thus help to secure for themselves a place in the business circles of the province, although this process is only just beginning. Such achievements are not wiped out by a change in government, and constitute a permanent step in the structural assimilation of the Acadian population.

We now come to the second of the ways in which a government may serve the interests of a minority ethnic group:

Fair treatment of groups or areas in which there are heavy concentrations of the ethnic group (no explicit recognition of ethnic differences).

One of the legacies of the expulsion and subsequent resettlement of the Acadians is that they occupy, by and large, the poorer areas of New Brunswick. Consequently

any action which tends to redress the balance within the province between the poorer and the more prosperous areas has the effect of making a substantial improvement in the material welfare of the Acadian population. This is precisely what is involved in the Robichaud government's "Program for Equal Opportunity" (or "Plan of Evolution"), which has presented the province with the most controversial issue of its politics since the struggles relating to Confederation.

The Program for Equal Opportunity is the Robichaud government's redefinition of the respective responsibilities of the provincial and municipal governments, and its regulation of the financial relations between the two. The object of the Program is to provide substantially equal services to New Brunswickers in all parts of the province. In general, it is designed to implement the major recommendations of the "Byrne Report," or the Report of the Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation (1963). The scope of the Program was sketched out in a White Paper published in March 1965, which says in part:

The functions of health, welfare, and justice have always been and will continue to be the responsibility of the provincial government. We have chosen to discharge these responsibilities by means of a particular pattern of local institutions. That pattern has been based largely on a principle of permitting each locality to do the best job possible within its means.

The White Paper then evokes the principle of "acceptance of minimum standards of service and opportunity for all

citizens, regardless of the financial resources of the locality in which they live," and continues:

The Government of New Brunswick is prepared to accept this principle. We are prepared to accept, from this point on, the full responsibility for acceptable minimum standards of education, health, welfare and justice for all New Brunswickers.¹

The legislative measures which together constitute the Program for Equal Opportunity were published as a group in November 1965. They include:

***Uniform evaluation and assessment of real estate taxes by the province, subject to an increment for municipal purposes to be levied by the municipalities individually but collected by the province. This abolishes the former wide discrepancies in the land tax between counties and between municipalities, and abolishes the poll tax and tax on personal property. To compensate for the loss in revenue, the sales tax rises from 3% to 6%, all of it accruing to the province.

***Statutory provincial grants to municipalities on the basis of an equalization formula. This does not bring municipal revenues to their former level, but the financial needs of the municipalities are reduced by the province's assumption of many functions formerly vested in the municipalities.

***Assumption by the province of the responsibilities and costs of education. Amalgamation of 422 school districts into 34. Standardization of salaries for teachers across the province, with a prohibition on local augmentation of salaries

¹Province of New Brunswick, White Paper on the Responsibilities of Government. Tabled in the Legislative Assembly, March 4, 1965.

in order to prevent the wealthier areas from attracting all the best teachers. Salary scales to be based on those in St. John, the highest in the province.

***Abolition of the county councils and assumption by the province of former county responsibilities in the fields of administration of justice, social welfare programs, and health. The effect of this is modified to some extent by the intention to incorporate localities of 300 or more persons as villages (which will result in the creation of more than 250 new municipalities), but those in rural areas are to come under the direct jurisdiction of the province, and will have no municipal government.

Some idea of the effects of the Program for Equal Opportunity can be obtained from glancing at the former inequities between counties and municipalities. The estimated rates of tax on real property at market value in 1961 ranged from 5.26% in Kent County and 4.06% in Gloucester to 1.30% in York and 1.36% in Kings. In the towns there was an almost equally wide variation, as exemplified by the comparison between Shediac (4.85%) and Sackville (1.35%) and Moncton (1.41%).¹ Of their total tax revenues, the counties devoted 85% or more to education, the only exception being Saint John (48%) and Restigouche, for which no comparable figures are available. The towns generally devoted a lesser per cent to education: Shediac - 72%, Sackville - 76%, Moncton - 42%.² Moreover, in spite

¹New Brunswick, Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation, Report, 1963, Table 1:1, p. 9.

²Ibid.

of the very wide discrepancies in tax burden between counties and between municipalities, local governments were unable to provide services of even approximately standard quality. For example, expenditure on education per pupil in 1960 in Kent and Gloucester counties (where tax rates were highest) was \$132 and \$136 respectively, whereas it was \$225 and \$216 in York and Kings (where tax rates were lowest).¹

By assuming responsibility for and the operating costs of education, health, welfare, and the administration of justice, the provincial government has undertaken to equalize to a substantial degree the standards of each of these services across the province, and at the same time to relieve the most heavily-taxed counties and towns of some of their tax burden. They would be left with purely local functions, that is, those functions which affect only those who live within their borders, such as: fire and police protection, water supply, sewage disposal, recreational facilities, zoning, and maintenance of streets.²

The Program for Equal Opportunity has proved to be a bitterly controversial one. The Conservative Opposition

¹Ibid., Table 8:1, p. 126.

²The Byrne Commission, in recommending the reallocation of responsibilities between the province and the municipalities, pointed out that education, health, welfare, and the administration of justice, are all services which affect people who live beyond the boundaries of individual municipalities.

has denounced the Government for excessive and unnecessary centralization in the administration of services hitherto provided by municipal governments. Most of the necessary legislation to implement the Program was introduced during the autumn of 1965, and was passed--some of it in substantially altered form, after public hearings in a specially-constituted Law Amendments Committee of the Legislature--during the winter and spring of 1966. It was proclaimed in January 1967. The Opposition was particularly vehement in decrying the abolition of the county councils and it alleged that the Government's plan was simply a "power grab," the purpose of which was to give the Government wider control over the patronage than had been held by any previous administration.

The strident trumpets of legislative battle have been strangely muted in their rendition of the theme of ethnic conflict over the Program for Equal Opportunity. This theme has been a sort of continuo underlying the rival voices which have clamoured for the public ear--always present, never obtrusive, never resting. For although the Program bestows no benefits on Acadians which it does not bestow on English-speaking New Brunswickers in like economic circumstances, the fact remains that the poorer areas of the province, which will benefit the most, are inhabited mostly by Acadians. Kent and Gloucester, which as we have already noted have the highest real estate tax rates and the lowest expenditure per pupil on education, are both

more than 80% inhabited by people of French origin. Within Westmorland County, the largely-Acadian town of Shediac levies a tax on real property at more than three times the rate in the English-speaking town of Sackville. It would be quite wrong to imply that there are no poor English counties or towns; nevertheless it will easily be appreciated that the Program for Equal Opportunity is of enormous potential significance to the Acadians as a group in equipping them to occupy a more important part in New Brunswick society. The costs of the Program, however, since it is an equalizing program, are necessarily borne to a large extent by the richer areas--the cities and the wealthier counties, which are mostly English-speaking. Thus the Rural Association of the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities had cause to warn the Government in its brief attacking the abolition of county councils: "[A] point which cannot be over-emphasized is that the program of equal opportunity is creating a serious rift between the two ethnic groups in this province."¹ While uttering this caveat, however, the Association explicitly declared its support for "those portions of the program designed to create opportunity and to make fiscal re-adjustments in this Province." This stand-acceptance in principle, con-

¹Rural Association of the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, Brief respecting the Program of Evolution. ([Mimeographed], March 18, 1966).

denation of particular aspects, admonitions against provoking racial animosity--seems to typify much of the controversy over the Program. The Government, naturally, has claimed that opposition to the details of the program betrays hostility to the principle of equalization itself; but it is difficult (especially for an outside observer) to tell what the real attitudes on the question are. It is even more difficult to know to what extent the issue is actually an ethnic one.

The uncertainty whether the controversy over the Program for Equal Opportunity masks an ethnic conflict is illustrated by the debate concerning the application of a uniform salary scale for teachers across the province. The predominantly English-speaking New Brunswick Teachers' Association denounced the uniform scale. In a dissenting brief, the Association d'Instituteurs Acadiens, which forms a part of the Teachers' Association, expressed its support for the uniform scale, as the only means by which the objective of equal opportunities could be achieved. Thus, in the case of the teachers the internal sub-division of the Association into French-language and English-language sections permitted the expression of opposing views, so that the different stands taken by the two ethnic groups were made unequivocally in public. In other associations, however, the difference between ethnic groups is not so obvious. One possible explanation of this situation is that in associations where there is no separate French-

language section, the opportunity for the expression of opposing views by Acadians and English-speaking New Brunswickers does not arise, and as a rule the Acadian element, being in the minority, finds it difficult to make itself heard. This argument was advanced by one of the participants at the Congrès of the Société Nationale des Acadiens in 1965:

Une première question: que penser de ces fédérations d'associations groupant en leur sein les deux éléments ethniques de nos provinces? Je veux illustrer ma pensée par un exemple récent. Quelles que soient nos opinions personnelles sur certains principes en jeu dans l'application du Rapport Byrne au Nouveau-Brunswick, on conviendra volontiers, je crois, que l'essentiel des recommandations touchant à l'éducation vise à nous assurer, à nous de langue française, la plus complète égalité possible - l'égalité fiscale par un système uniforme d'impôts fonciers et l'égalité de chance dans le domaine de l'instruction publique.

Or les manchettes des journaux nous ont fait assister, impuissants, à de véhémentes protestations présentées aux autorités provinciales en notre nom. L'union des municipalités s'est opposée avec force à cette notion d'égalité, et elle parlait au nom des municipalités du Madawaska, de Restigouche, de Gloucester et de Kent. La Fédération des Commissions Scolaires a combattu farouchement plusieurs recommandations qui visent à nous affranchir, et elle représentait les commissaires d'école de tous les Comtés français sus-mentionnés. La New Brunswick Teachers' Association, dans un mémoire particulièrement agressif, a protesté vertement contre des mesures qui nous vaudraient des avantages évidents, et elle parlait au nom de ses 6000 membres,

y compris les 2000 de l'A.I.A. / Association
d'Instituteurs Acadiens_7. 1

In point of fact the comments about the stand taken by the Union of Municipalities are not entirely accurate. The Union initially opposed the proscription on local salary supplements, but later reversed its stand and urged that a mandatory scale be adopted--but one which would give teachers in rural areas a higher salary in order to prevent all the best teachers from going to the cities.² Furthermore, Kent and Restigouche counties both contributed to the cost of preparing the brief requesting the retention of the county councils, although Gloucester and Madawaska did not. Thus it would be incorrect to say that the pronouncements of the Union of Municipalities were entirely unsupported by the Acadian counties.

Moreover, the allegation that the Acadian interest in relation to the Program for Equal Opportunity has been submerged in voluntary associations with mixed membership is not borne out by the actions of other associations. The New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture supported the recommendations of the Byrne Commission and the Government's plan to implement them, although in the December 1965 convention of the Federation a number of delegates, all of them from English counties, attacked the proposal to

¹Rev. Frère Médéric, s.c.; XI^{Ve} Congrès Général des Acadiens: Nos Forces Vives Face à l'Avenir. Société Nationale des Acadiens, 1965, pp. 58-59.

²Saint John Telegraph-Journal, May 14, 1966, p. 15.

abolish the county councils. The New Brunswick Federation of Labour also expressed guarded approval of the Program, in principle, although most of its comments on the plan were focussed on the rights of public employees to collective bargaining.¹ The few sentences commending the principle of "Equalization through Centralization" which were contained in the Federation's brief to the Law Amendments Committee were criticized by some members of the Federation, and the Federation abstained from further pronouncement on it. In sum, while there is a certain amount of evidence of difference of opinion along ethnic lines within associations, it is clear that non-ethnic considerations have also been important in determining attitudes towards the Program. For example, the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities supported (eventually) the uniform teachers' salary scale and even suggested further modifications going beyond the Government's proposal. The Federation of Agriculture supported the Program as a tax relief measure affecting English-speaking and Acadian farmers alike, even though some of them clearly did not like the abolition of the county councils.

To summarize: the Program for Equal Opportunity has been controversial, and it has ethnic implications of great

¹New Brunswick Federation of Labour, "A Submission of the New Brunswick Federation of Labour and Canadian Union of Public Employees (New Brunswick Division) to the Select Committee on Law Amendments of the Legislative Assembly of New Brunswick," (Fredericton, N.B., mimeographed, December 10, 1965).

importance. Unquestionably the equalization which is embodied in the Program will be of enormous benefit to the Acadians. It cannot, however, be regarded as a purely ethnic issue, because it will benefit other disadvantaged groups in the province as well as Acadians. Particular aspects of the Program have been attacked, and others defended, on the basis of non-ethnic considerations. This fact has been illustrated by the stands taken by a number of voluntary associations, and by the discussions within the associations in determining the position to be taken by them. Thus it probably would be fair to say that almost all New Brunswickers who have concerned themselves with the Program either in supporting or opposing it, have recognized that it has presented the province with an issue which is partially an ethnic one but certainly not wholly so.

It is precisely the fact that the Government has been able to present the Program for Equal Opportunity as a non-ethnic issue that has made sponsorship of it politically feasible. Had it been, or were it to become, a purely ethnic issue--that is, one which divided the province on ethnic lines--its defeat and the defeat of the Government which proposed its adoption would be almost certain. This would be the inexorable consequence of pitting a minority against the majority.

From the point of view of the Acadians, the action of the Robichaud Government in sponsoring the Program has

justified as a tactical success the bloc support which they have been giving the Liberal Party. The Conservatives have not attacked the principle of equalization, but it is most unlikely that they would have taken the initiative which the Liberals did. It appears therefore that the "one-party tactic" has scored a success of the greatest importance, by strengthening the reformist elements within the Liberal Party. Had these elements been diffused within the two parties, it is doubtful that the Program would ever have been launched. The Acadians, by concentrating their political resources behind one party--it is not necessary for this to have a conscious tactical manoeuvre--made it possible for the Liberal Party to undertake a program which, without their bloc support, would in all likelihood have been judged to be too risky.

A final comment about the probable effect as far as the Acadians are concerned, of the Program for Equal Opportunity. In addition to raising standards of material welfare by providing better services at lower rates of taxation, the Program can be expected to encourage the structural assimilation of the Acadians. The education reforms are especially important in this respect. What is not so clear, however, is whether the structural assimilation can be achieved without behavioural assimilation as well. The answer to the question is necessarily a speculative one; we have no data which can guide us towards an answer. The following observation, however, may be made.

The preservation of a minority culture may be sought through protection against "contamination" from the outside, i.e. from the majority. An attempt can be made to create a community apart, geographically distinct wherever possible, and always minimizing contact with the alien majority. In practice this can be expected to lead to the creation of what one might call a partial society--one which performs a functionally specialized role within the total society, as does for instance a primarily agrarian ethnic group in an industrial society. A defensive form of minority-group nationalism, in other words, seeks to protect the group against behavioural assimilation by setting up barriers to structural assimilation. This idea or objective has occupied a prominent part in French-Canadian nationalism in Quebec as well as among the Acadians.

In recent years, as we noted in Chapter II, protective or defensive nationalism, at least in Quebec, has been increasingly regarded as being doomed to ultimate failure. The conservative ideology which is necessarily linked to this form of nationalism accentuates the gap in material living standards between the ethnic minority and the culturally alien majority. At a certain point a reaction sets in, and the members of the minority culture refuse to go on selling their pottage for a mess of birth-right.¹ The response of many French-Canadian nationalists has been to

¹Not my witticism, I confess.

abandon the conservative ideology and to seek the épanouissement of the French-Canadian nation, using the Etat de Québec as an important instrument or ally. This form of nationalism has been described by Jean-Marc Leger as having the following characteristics:

- (1) a priority for efforts at the advancement of the French-Canadian people over the defence of the French presence against "enemies from the outside";
- (2) a willingness to take up the legitimate claims of the masses, and to impose respect for what is French by the quality of the French-Canadian nation rather than by constant representations to Ottawa (but without dropping the use of these tactics altogether);
- (3) a dissociation of nationalism from right-wing ideology and paternalism;
- (4) a recognition that the need of security among the masses is justified, as is the need for a systematically planned organization in economic and social fields;
- (5) an urgent desire that nationalism should above all things not be an imposture,

or become an alibi [a cloak?] for the selfishness of those at the head of affairs, but that it should help towards economic and social advancement just as much as national freeing of the French-Canadian group;

- (6) the abandonment of the cry "the language, guardian of the Faith," of the alliance of "the throne and the altar," an attitude which coincides with a rewarding "aclericalism" and the search for a more authentic practice of Christianity.....¹

Whether or not this form of nationalism can work in New Brunswick, where the Acadians influence but do not control the provincial government, is the question which undoubtedly will determine whether or not the Acadians can survive as a culturally distinct group. The fact that the Program for Equal Opportunity and other measures to promote the structural assimilation of the Acadians have the support of Acadian leaders may be regarded as evidence of their confidence that their cultural distinctiveness is

¹Jean-Marc Leger: "French-Canadian Nationalism," University of Toronto Quarterly, v. 27, 1958, p. 325. M. Leger also lists other characteristics of this form of nationalism.

best protected by playing the fullest role of which they are capable within the New Brunswick society. This constitutes rejection of the view that structural assimilation is incompatible with ethnic pluralism.

In seeking the advancement of the Acadian people, Acadian voluntary associations have an important role to play; and the aid of the state, too, may be invoked within the limits of what can be achieved through it by a minority group. One tactic which may be used is for the minority to ally itself with other groups to achieve reforms or to promote policies which favour not only the ethnic minority but its "ally groups" as well. In this way it can hope to secure fair treatment for groups or areas in which there are heavy concentrations of members of the minority group, while attempting to prevent explicitly ethnic issues from arising.

We now turn to a discussion of the third way a government may serve the interests of an ethnic minority. Where there is recognition of differences of language or religion in the provision of government services, the government could be said to be creating a barrier to the behavioural assimilation of the minority. There is also a far greater danger of political controversy arising along ethnic lines.¹

¹No doubt political controversy may arise in part because of a desire - conscious or unconscious - to assimilate the minority culture; but this fact does not affect our analysis.

For these two reasons, in our analysis of the ways in which a government may serve the interests of a minority ethnic group, we created a separate category for "Provision of equal services to the ethnic group with recognition of the linguistic or confessional distinctiveness of the group."

The outstanding example of a service which is moulded to the needs of a minority ethnic group is the establishment of a separate school system to serve the minority in their own language and in accordance with their own religion. All government services, however, in principle are subject to evaluation on the basis of their availability to the ethnic minority in their own language. Thus, a further sign of the sensitivity of the Robichaud Government to the needs and aspirations of the Acadians is that it is now standard practice for the government to answer all letters in the language in which they were sent (English or French).¹ Once the necessary civil service personnel have been hired to handle correspondence in French, and to provide advisory services through fisheries officers, government agriculturalists, etc.) in both languages equally,² it becomes easier for a subsequent government to

¹Hugh G. Thorburn: Ethnic Participation and Language Use in the Public Service of New Brunswick, p. 166.

²We have no data relating to the standards of such services, beyond the allegation of one interviewee that the advisory services to French-speaking farmers are not on a par with similar services in the English language. Whether or not this remark is justified, it does point to another area of possible discrimination against the Acadians, which is subject to redress by the one-party tactic.

maintain such services, and also more difficult (for political reasons) to withdraw them. It is therefore likely that if one government initiates a policy of (say) replying to French-language letters in that language, this is likely to be of permanent benefit to the ethnic minority, especially when the minority is increasing more rapidly in population than other groups. If we are right in discerning in New Brunswick a ratchet-effect in cases such as this, then the one-party tactic may realize permanent improvements in the services provided to the Acadians.

The provision of separate school facilities for Roman Catholics and the establishment of "bilingual" schools to serve the French-speaking population in New Brunswick provides an excellent example of how the needs of a minority group can be at least partially met by deliberate avoidance of political controversy. The law on separate schools was firmly stated in 1871: "All schools conducted under this Act shall be non-sectarian"; and the provision still stands.¹ Although this clause was deleted from the original version of the revised Schools Act which was laid before the legislature as part of the Program for Equal Opportunity, the Premier later indicated the intention of the Government to have it restored.² Moreover, the Schools Act, which

¹Article 110 of the Schools Act, quoted in C.B. Sissons, Church and State in Canadian Education (Toronto: Ryerson, 1959), p. 217.

²Michel Despland et Louis Balthazar, s.j. (auteurs conjoints): Relations entre culture et religion au niveau

governs all publicly-financed schools in the province, makes no provision for separate French-language or bilingual schools. The apparent inflexibility of the law, however, is substantially modified by custom to the point where the Acadians have acquired French-language confessional schools in many parts of the province. This development has been possible by the action of local school trustees and by a series of concessions by the provincial Board of Education, which is dominated by the Cabinet.

The Schools Act of 1871, insofar as it attempted to create a single, secular, school system, was a failure from the start.¹ In many parts of the province the Catholics (both Irish and Acadian) refused to apply the new law, or to pay taxes for the support of schools established under the Act. A number of incidents occurred, some of them involving violence and one resulting in a death. In the face of large-scale non-compliance with the law, a Government headed by the original sponsor of the Act offered in 1875 to compromise in its application. The Government was in a position to do this by virtue of the fact that the Cabinet formed a heavy majority in the Board of Education, which was given the power to "make regulations for the organiza-

de l'éducation dans trois régions du Canada, Rapport de recherche soumis à la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme, /Canada/ (/mimeographed/, avril 1966), pp. 22-3, 23n.

¹The following historical account of the development of the schools system in New Brunswick is drawn almost entirely from Sissons, op. cit., pp. 229-250.

tion, government and discipline of schools" and to "prescribe textbooks..and courses or standards of instruction and study for schools."¹ These powers were used by the Cabinet in 1875 to effect a compromise which was proposed to it by five Catholic members of the legislature. There were four concessions, which have been described by C.B. Sissons as follows:

- (1) that children, with the consent of the trustees, might attend any school in the district, an arrangement conducive to segregation on a religious basis;
- (2) that licenses might be issued to members of a religious order if they had a certificate from the superior of that order, a procedure which excused from normal school training and regular examination;
- (3) that textbooks should be edited or annotated in such a way as to avoid giving offence to Catholics;

¹Sections 5(e) and (f) of the Schools Act, 1871; quoted in Sissons, op. cit., p. 247. The Board of Education now consists of: the entire cabinet, the Lieutenant Governor, the President of the University of New Brunswick, a representative of the New Brunswick Teachers' Association, and the Chief Superintendent of Education (appointed by the Cabinet).

- (4) that religious instruction be permitted after school hours at the will of the trustees.

Sissons comments:

These concessions, added to that made in 1873 as to garb and emblems / which permitted, in effect, nuns to wear their habits in public schools / encouraged a type of school which in default of careful public supervision, might actually become sectarian, and thus violate the Act. It is noteworthy that the four new provisions were made by the Cabinet, not by the Legislature or by the Board of Education. Whether the three members of the Board outside the Cabinet were at any stage privy to the negotiations does not appear. Once the terms were agreed upon, the Superintendent must have been informed of them and instructed to apply them. But they were not published officially at the time....In fact it was eighteen years before they saw the light of day.

As events have shown, the pattern for Church and State was set in the committee room at Fredericton in 1875 and the court chamber at Bathurst in 1896 / when the 1875 agreement was confirmed, in effect, by decision of one Judge Barker. / Educational policies as affecting religious interests henceforth were not to flow from free discussion in press and parliament, or from the weighing of nice points of law by a bench of learned jurists. One may search in vain for any provision having to do with religion in the New Brunswick Schools Act of today other than the bald edict dating back to 1871, "All schools conducted under this Act shall be non-sectarian;" and in the tomes reporting the decisions of the Supreme Court or of the Privy Council during the past sixty years there is not a single case affecting the rights of the individual conscience or the claims of a religious communion which carries the interpretation of the law beyond Judge Barker's decision. But steadily, as the French-speaking population has in-

creased, there has been a drift away from a common system towards the Quebec plan of segregation on a language and religious basis.¹

The establishment of bilingual schools, i.e. those in which some or all subjects are taught in French, has been accomplished in a similarly unobtrusive fashion. The Board of Education--or, in practice, the Cabinet--has enjoyed, through lack of legal restriction to the contrary, the power to approve textbooks in the French language. Under this arrangement the first bilingual readers with English and French printed on opposite pages, were adopted in 1872, the year after the passage of the Schools Act. Since that time there has been a gradual extension in the number of courses which may be taught with French-language textbooks (and examinations written in French) at the option of the local school trustees.² The present situation is that high schools may choose French-language texts for history, French language and literature, and Latin; recently it was decided to extend the allowed range of French-language instruction to include mathematics and the natural sciences.

¹Sissons, op. cit., pp. 239, 246-7.

²A detailed account of the adoption of French-language texts is contained in Roland-E. Soucie, C.S.C.: Evolution scolaire dans trois communautés acadiennes de la Province du Nouveau-Brunswick, Rapport présenté à la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme, / Canada / (mimeographed /, mars 1966), pp. 19-21, 36-9.

It must be stressed that the provision of instruction in the French language, and/or the adoption of practices to make a given school (in effect) confessional in character, is wholly at the discretion of the local school trustees. No one can claim recognition of linguistic or religious rights in his school or in his district, because there are no such rights by law. The result of this has been to create a series of conflicts at the local level over the question of what special school facilities, if any, are to be provided for Acadians in mixed communities. In Moncton, it was only recently (1963) that the Acadians were successful in obtaining a bilingual high school, which in 1967-8 began to give all instruction in French. This was considered to be a major achievement, and the decision to proceed with its construction was the culmination of a long struggle. For example, when a petition for "satisfactory High School facilities" for French-speaking pupils was presented to the Moncton School Board in 1959, it provoked hostile resolutions from local Orange Lodges and the Loyal True Blue Association (amongst other associations), "requesting the Board not to provide special separate high school facilities for children whose mother tongue is French and that immediate action to correct any present known violations in Moncton of the Schools Act be taken."¹

¹Minutes of the Moncton School Board, Jan. 27, 1960; quoted in Soucie, op. cit., Part I, p. 78.

When the Board finally took action to build the new school, it did so in response to private requests from a few Acadian leaders, who took special care to see that their initiative received no publicity. As one of them explained to us, if word had leaked out that the matter was again before the Board, those hostile to the project would have again attempted to block it.

The history of the schools issue in New Brunswick provides strong evidence that for an ethnic minority to provoke political controversy over its demands is likely to prove extremely damaging to itself. The most important achievements of the Acadian people in obtaining confessional and French-language schools have been made by private representations rather than by public clamour. On the other hand, when during the debate on the Schools Act in 1871, the question of making special provision for the minority was put explicitly before the province, the minority--in this case the Catholics generally rather than the Acadians alone--suffered a serious set-back. Attitudes have changed since that time, but not to the point where, in a revision of the Schools Act, the Government could afford to delete the now virtually inoperative clause declaring the schools to be non-sectarian.¹

For an ethnic minority, therefore, the avoidance of

¹Above, p. 380.

political controversy over its demands is a rule of collective prudence; unfortunately it imposes rather inflexible limits on the objectives to which the minority can aspire through what we have called the "one-party tactic." In particular, the one-party tactic cannot be used to establish or protect minority rights by legislation. It is this legal protection of language or religious rights which is, by our analysis, the fourth and final way in which a government may serve the interests of a minority ethnic group.¹

Before examining the means of achieving legal protection for language or religious rights, let us review and extend our previous comments on the value of the one-party tactic in promoting the interests of an ethnic minority. We shall take, in turn, each of the first three categories of government action relating to the advancement of an ethnic minority.

First: In the fight against discrimination in the exercise of the administrative powers of government, the ethnic minority may score important successes through the one-party tactic by forcing its party, when in power, to give it fair treatment in making patronage appointments, granting contracts, etc. In this case political controversy is minimized by the fact that such disputes as do arise over the Government's actions generally occur only

¹Above, p. 355.

at the local level and there they are restricted as a rule to the councils or cabals of the "in" party.

In the second case--that of the Government's giving fair treatment to groups or areas in which there are heavy concentrations of the ethnic group--the one-party tactic may succeed in winning important policy concessions for the minority by combining the minority's interests with those of other groups and avoiding discussion of the ethnic implications of the issue. This is a little more dangerous for the minority than the first case, because the temptation may arise for the Opposition to emphasize the ethnic aspect. The more support it normally obtains from the ethnic group, however, the less likely it is to do so. We noted that the Conservative Party has avoided potentially explosive ethnic implications of the Program for Equal Opportunity.

The third case--provision of equal services to the ethnic group, with recognition of its cultural distinctiveness--raises in more acute form the danger of political conflict along ethnic lines. The use of the one-party tactic is correspondingly more of a gamble. The prospect of success for the minority in winning equal treatment for itself--cognizance being taken of its linguistic or religious particularity--depends on the government's being able to implement its policy without having to obtain explicit approval for it in the legislature. Even so, political controversy can be avoided only when the Opposition

deliberately eschews making an onslaught on the Government for "excessive partiality" towards the ethnic group in its administrative actions. The temptation may be difficult to resist unless the Opposition obtains a fair amount of electoral support from the minority ethnic group.

We turn now to the fourth case--that of the establishment or protection of minority rights by legislation. Here the one-party tactic may be presumed to be quite useless. The ethnic question cannot be concealed, as in the exercise of patronage; it cannot be camouflaged by emphasizing non-ethnic aspects; and it cannot be tactfully ignored by the Opposition. The only way of avoiding party controversy in the case of providing legal guarantees of minority rights, therefore, is to see that criticism is effectively silenced or at least muffled within each party, and not simply within one of them. In other words, the non-Government party or parties must contain enough supporters from the ethnic minority to give the Opposition a stake in avoiding political controversy on ethnic issues.

In every instance, what especially must be avoided by the ethnic minority is its own political isolation. It must do all in its power to prevent the coalescence of political forces outside itself into a unit which is hostile to its demands, and perhaps even desirous of its destruction as a distinct cultural entity. Wherever, as a result of such a development, political cleavage in the system coincides with the ethnic cleavage, the result can-

not but be disastrous for the ethnic minority. To state this is simply to echo Laurier's expressed fear of the French Canadians' forming a party by themselves, a course which during the height of the debate on the execution of Louis Riel he described as "simply suicidal". Naturally this does not preclude the possibility of the group's forming a bloc within one party--what we have referred to as the one-party tactic--but in such a case the group must seek alliances with other groups, hoping to create a party capable of obtaining an electoral majority.

If I am right in arguing that the usefulness of the one-party tactic is limited to furthering the structural assimilation of an ethnic minority, it follows that bloc voting behaviour is a symptom of an ethnic minority's subordinate position. The one-party tactic, if successful, is self-liquidating, because its aim is to abolish the "ethnic class". Once this aim has been achieved, the one-party tactic can no longer help the group; and one would accordingly expect it, if it works, to be a temporary phenomenon. Indeed, bloc voting behaviour would naturally tend to die out as the ethnic group develops a complete class structure of its own, which can happen only when the group no longer occupies a functionally-specialized role in the society as a whole.¹ Once this happens, non-ethnic factors are increasingly likely to influence voting

¹See above, pp. 322-30

decisions, because (by hypothesis) class cleavage and occupational cleavage no longer coincide with division between ethnic groups.

We would now suggest that the enacting of legal guarantees of minority rights is likely to be almost the last achievement of an ethnic minority in winning for itself an equal place in the society rather than (as is sometimes thought) a preliminary step. This hypothesis is founded on our previous assertion that, since no ethnic minority can afford to isolate itself politically by provoking controversy on explicitly ethnic questions, it must abandon its bloc voting behaviour before there is any reasonable prospect of legislation being enacted to protect language or religious rights.

Bloc voting behaviour, however, is likely to persist as long as the ethnic minority stands to benefit from it, that is, until the group has succeeded in achieving structural assimilation. This stage, of course, may never be reached, and bloc voting behaviour may continue as long as the ethnic minority retains its identity as a distinct cultural grouping; but under such circumstances the prospects for securing legislation to protect its cultural identity would appear to be very slim, precisely because such legislation would undoubtedly be controversial and the minority would find itself politically isolated on the issue. In such a case, therefore, the minority would be exposed to a process of attrition--unable (by hypothesis)

to erase the ethnic impediment to the advancement of members of the group in the society, and unable to protect itself as a collectivity by obtaining legal guarantees of linguistic or religious rights.

When the situation is viewed in this light, there appear to be some grounds for the view that ethnic pluralism cannot, in the long run, be retained except through the structural assimilation of ethnic minorities. Thus we arrive at a complete reversal of Porter's tentative suggestion that structural assimilation may be incompatible with the retention of ethnic pluralism.¹

* * *

Our remarks concerning the role of political parties in serving the interests of ethnic minorities are supported by an analysis of the situation prevailing in Quebec, where the French-Canadians constitute a numerical majority within the province, although occupying in some respects a subordinate position, but occupy a minority position in the country as a whole.

At the outset of this chapter we noted that it is extremely difficult to determine how, if at all, ethnicity affects voting behaviour in Brome-Missisquoi.² Neither in

¹Above, p. 354.

²An attempt to test for a correlation between ethnicity and voting behaviour yielded inconclusive results. The closest available indication of ethnic origin by

federal nor in provincial elections is there any apparent correlation, for the different parts of the two counties, between voting patterns and ethnic origin of the voters. Moreover, informants consistently denied that ethnic origin had any political significance. No party worker whom we questioned about the reasons for his particular political affiliation said that his party was more favourable to his own ethnic group. In all these respects our experience in Brome-Missisquoi was in marked contrast to that in Westmorland. Indeed, we heard of only two instances of repercussions from what might be called ethnic issues. In neither case was the ethnic aspect referred to explicitly. One was that two individuals, an English-speaking Conservative and a French-speaking Liberal, had established their lifelong party affiliation in 1917 over the conscription issue. The other instance related to the provincial election of 1939, when Premier Duplessis challenged the war effort of the Mackenzie King Government; some informants attributed the Union Nationale's loss of Missisquoi in that election to an adverse vote by the English-speaking population. It is to be noted, however,

municipality was contained in Canada, Post Office Department, Number of Householders served by Post Offices and Rural Routes in the Province of Quebec (1959). This publication lists separately the number of English- and French-speaking householders served by each post office and rural route in the Province, by constituency. The data obtained from it were matched, as closely as was possible, with voting statistics by poll. The results showed nothing of significance.

that voting patterns no longer reflect this, and also that the more British Brome county continued to support the Union Nationale in 1939 and through until 1956. As one English-speaking informant said: "We didn't none of us like that Three Rivers speech [by Duplessis, 1939, attacking the federal government for using the war as an excuse to extend its own power at the expense of the provinces], but of course we couldn't let down John Robinson [M.L.A. for Brome]."

That the ethnic factor is apparently insignificant as a determinant of voting behaviour in Brome-Missisquoi is what one would expect in view of our argument that bloc voting behaviour by an ethnic minority is a symptom of its subordinate position. One certainly could not say of the English-speaking people in Quebec that they have occupied a subordinate position. They have had no need, as the Acadians in New Brunswick have had to use political means to protect their position in the province. On the contrary, the English-speaking Quebecers have bargained with the provincial government as the representative of the majority ethnic group in the province. They have been able to adopt this means of protecting their rights or their privileges because of the wealth which they have possessed and the external capital whose investment they have influenced; one witnesses in this case an example of negotiation between private economic power and the public power, which is political; such negotiations are possible because

wealth is as much a component of political power as strength of numbers is. Thus the official use of the English language, the provision of a very high standard of English-language Protestant education, and equality (or superiority) of services to the English-speaking minority have all been protected by wealth, as well as by (except in the last case) constitutional guarantees established a century ago as part of an agreement to which the French-speaking residents of Canada East were an assenting minority.

In view of the power which the English-speaking Quebecers have possessed as a result of their wealth, the aspect of policy which is most significant for ethnic relations is not the question of guarantees of the rights of an ethnic minority, but the rights which are to be accorded to private capital. Here we have an issue which is analogous to that raised by the Byrne Report and the Program for Equal Opportunity in New Brunswick. It is ostensibly an economic and ideological issue, and indeed its significance in these respects is of the first magnitude; but it is also an issue which carries important ethnic implications.

Since the first world war there have been periodic and recurrent demands to wrest economic control from "les trusts" and Anglo-Saxon capital in general--that is, to use the state to attack the citadel of economic power. This objective was a central feature of the Action française movement of the early and middle 'twenties with its slogan

"Emparons-nous de l'industrie"; it reappeared as the basis of the program of the Union Nationale in the middle 'thirties; and in the 'sixties it found a new although noticeably less truculent formulation in the Liberal platform under the slogan of "Maîtres chez nous". In each case the policy of French-Canadian control over the Quebec economy has been combined with demands for revision of the federal system to place greater powers in the hands of the provincial government. These demands are evidence of the fact that each of these nationalist movements was advocating the strategy of using the power of the state to attack privileges enjoyed by English capital.

The latest manifestation of the policy of economic nationalism, as appears in the program of the Liberal Party and perhaps less clearly of the Union Nationale, has been formulated in such a way as not to threaten the position of English capital as such, but to emphasize the social responsibilities of capital. It attempts to promote the economic advancement of French-Canadians within externally-controlled companies as well as through the establishment of French Canadian enterprises. Thus the present stance of both parties is autonomist, while at the same time they take pains to emphasize they are hostile neither to the English-speaking minority, nor to external capital. The differences between the two parties, therefore, on the question of French-Canadian economic nationalism are not at all easy to define.

The fact that in recent years the Quebec provincial parties have not taken noticeably different stands on the issue of French-Canadian economic nationalism may help to account for the difficulty in discerning how ethnicity affects voting behaviour in Missisquoi and Brome.

On the other hand it may correctly be pointed out that the English-speaking constituencies in Montreal have been for many years amongst the safest Liberal seats in the province. This would seem to suggest that in parts of the province other than the area where we did our field research ethnicity is indeed a significant determinant of voting patterns. Further support for the notion that English-speaking Quebecers, especially in Montreal, tend to support the Liberals is provided by two voting studies done by sample survey by the Groupe de Recherches Sociales. In 1960, of 34 English-speaking Montrealers, 50% expressed preference for the Liberals, as opposed to 38% for the Union Nationale.¹ In 1962, of 41 English-speaking Montrealers, 78% expressed a favourable opinion of the Liberal Government; elsewhere in the province the figure was only 55% (of 22 English-speaking persons interviewed).² These per-

¹Groupe de Recherches Sociales, Les électeurs québécois: Attitudes et opinions à la veille de l'élection de 1960 (Montréal: Groupe de Recherches Sociales, 1960), Tableau 19, p. 47.

²Groupe de Recherches Sociales, Les préférences des électeurs québécois en 1962 (Montréal: Groupe de Recherches Sociales, Août 1964), Tableau 8, p. 11.

centages are not very reliable because the English-speaking portion of the total sample (1000) in each case is very small.

Unfortunately it is also far from clear what importance ethnicity has as a determinant of voting behaviour, and to what extent socio-economic characteristics such as class and occupation are really the significant ones. It may well be that these characteristics correlate more closely to voting patterns than ethnicity does. Indeed, this possibility gains some credence from the fact that English-speaking Montrealers appear to support the Liberals more heavily than do English-speaking people who live elsewhere in the province. One suspects that the rural-urban cleavage, which has become increasingly apparent in recent years, is important within the English-speaking population of the province as well as amongst the French-speaking Quebecois. In Montreal itself, the proportionately greater support for the Liberals amongst English-speaking people could be equally well explained by class differences as by differences in ethnic origin or language. Our data, therefore, are quite inconclusive--it remains, as in Missisquoi and Brome, difficult to tell what influence, if any, ethnicity has on voting patterns.

We conclude, first, that the political behaviour of the English-speaking population in Quebec is quite different from that of the Acadians in New Brunswick; second, that this may be explained by the very different status of these

two minorities; and third, that a comparison of the two groups and their political behaviour is useful in assessing the role of political parties in serving the interests of ethnic minorities. The problem which confronts the Acadians is to win acceptance as equals in New Brunswick society, while at the same time seeking to preserve their cultural identity. In the Acadians' struggle to abolish the ethnic impediment to their social mobility, strength of numbers has been and remains their greatest asset; tactically speaking, the problem is to use this political resource to its greatest possible effect. We analyzed the possible achievements and the probable limitations of the strategy of putting their political resources--leadership and votes--into one party. We concluded that this strategy, which we called the one-party tactic, may achieve substantial success in promoting the structural assimilation of the Acadians, (or any ethnic minority if it is sufficiently large) but that measures explicitly designed to protect their cultural distinctiveness probably cannot be achieved through the one-party tactic because of the danger that the other party or parties may attempt to mobilize the majority against the minority demands. If this happens it is bound to be fatal to the interests of the minority.

By contrast with the Acadians, however, the English-speaking residents of Quebec are not faced with the problem of overcoming subordinate status. Moreover, they have not the strength of numbers which the Acadians have. Thus they

have been in the position of defending an established position, not through the political parties, but by negotiating with the provincial government on the question of the rights of private capital. This is the fundamental ethnic issue, since the protection of their rights as a culturally distinct ethnic minority depends on their wealth rather than on their numbers. They can influence political decisions because the inflow of capital depends to a certain extent on how they are treated as a group, and what demands will be made on industry to recognize its social responsibility to its employees and to the community in which it is located. English capital can also, of course, augment its bargaining power by financing political parties, and in this sense they could be said to be using the parties to serve the interests of their own ethnic group. This fact, however, merely serves to emphasize the difference between the position of the English minority in Quebec and the Acadians in New Brunswick, and the corresponding difference in the ways available to them to advance or protect their position. The role of the political parties in the two cases is not in any way comparable.

* * *

The role of the Quebecois in federal politics is similar to that of the Acadians in New Brunswick politics. In the federal political system, as in New Brunswick, there is an ethnic minority occupying a subordinate position;

and the minority has adopted the strategy of concentrating its support behind a single political party in order to maximize its political influence.

The dilemma of French Canada in Confederation / writes Ramsay Cook / can be simply stated: How can a self-conscious minority preserve its rights in a community governed by majoritarian rules--that is, on the basis of representation by population? There have been in the past several responses to this question. One answer was strong, united, French-Canadian representation at Ottawa, and especially in the federal cabinet. This is the Cartier-Laurier-Lapointe-St. Laurent tradition. A second answer has been an emphasis on provincial rights in a federation which, in origin, was highly centralized...

In the years since 1867 French Canadians have made their major adjustment to Confederation in the fashion that Cartier had recommended: effective leadership in the federal cabinet where an ad hoc system of concurrent majorities seemed at least partly feasible. A long line of vigorous French-Canadian politicians, beginning with Cartier himself and stretching through Laurier and Lapointe to St. Laurent, forcefully upheld the viewpoint of French Canada. It was in political action rather than in legal and moral compacts that these men placed their faith. ¹

We cannot analyze here the successes and the failures of political action in defending the interests of French-Canadians in the federal arena. Nevertheless it will be useful to make a few comments on this subject, by way of an extension of our analysis of ethnicity and politics in New Brunswick.

¹Ramsay Cook, Canada and The French-Canadian Question (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 62-3, 69.

The most elementary and perhaps also the most important observation to be made concerning the use of the one-party tactic in federal politics is this: that crisis situations reveal the limitations, not the achievements, of this strategy. The one-party tactic is most effective in cases where decisions are taken in Cabinet behind closed doors, or alternatively where administrative decisions are involved which need not necessarily even come before the Cabinet. To argue this is to concede that the one-party tactic may not work in the case of really important decisions, but the myriad of administrative actions which individually are insignificant can, when taken together, have a very important effect on the place which French-Canadians occupy in Canadian society. Moreover, when Cabinet decisions are involved, frequently a negative decision is as important as a positive one, and in such cases it may not even be publicly known what possible choices were before the Cabinet. In these circumstances the Government party's dependence on French-Canadian support may be a very powerful factor in restraining it from action which would be damaging to the interests of French Canada.

It may be remarked that during the King-Lapointe era, the French-Canadian representatives in the Cabinet played an important role in determining the character of the Canadian federal system. Their influence helped to preserve the autonomy of the provinces during the inter-war

years. We ought, therefore, to qualify Ramsay Cook's allusion to two responses to French Canada's minority position. Political action at the federal level and the preservation of provincial autonomy ought not to be considered only as alternatives, because frequently they have been inter-related: provincial rights have been protected during certain periods of Canadian history by the "strong, united, French-Canadian representation at Ottawa....especially in the federal cabinet." To give one example: At the time when the federal cabinet was considering the petitions urging disallowance of the "Padlock Act" in 1938, Lapointe threatened to resign if the Government acted.¹ The threatened resignation is the more interesting for the fact that the Padlock Act must have been abhorrent to Lapointe personally; but it had passed the provincial legislature unanimously and he felt that his own position and that of his colleagues from Quebec would have been jeopardized if the federal government had listened to pleas for its disallowance. Indeed, during Lapointe's period as leader of the Quebec Liberals, he exercised a virtual veto on all cabinet decisions which, in his own estimation, were of vital importance to French Canada.²

¹Frederick W. Gibson, "King, Lapointe, and the Power of Disallowance," unpublished paper, kindly made available to me by Professor Gibson.

²The relationship between King and Lapointe, and Lapointe's position in the Cabinet are discussed in Frederick W. Gibson, (ed.), Cabinet Formation and Bi-

The case of the Padlock Act does not prove that the interests of French Canada are always protected within the federal cabinet, and nor does the career of Lapointe taken as a whole. The Padlock Act and the career of Lapointe, however, do indicate that a full analysis of the successes and the failures of the political action in defending the interests of French Canada would necessarily have to take into account much more than the crises which have periodically arisen along ethnic lines in Canada. One must consider also the routine activities of government and the cabinet decisions which have averted crises. The alliances which French Canadian leaders have formed with other groups or other regions in the country, as for example in the defence of provincial autonomy, have enabled them to take effective action, although not uniformly effective action, to further the interests of French Canada. On those occasions, however, when controversy has arisen over explicitly ethnic issues, and consequently the minority has been politically isolated, the result has been very damaging to it. One need only recollect the schools issues in various provinces--issues which had their ramifications in federal politics--or the conscription crises, to remind oneself of this. It was recognition of the fact that a minority,

cultural Relations: Seven Case Studies, A Report Presented to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism / Canada / (mimeographed / May 1966), pp. v. 2, pp. 327-35, 340. The parts referred to are contributed by the editor.

when it finds no allies elsewhere in the country, must lose every battle that caused Laurier to emphasize that "This country must be governed and can be governed simply on questions of policy and administration."

* * *

We conclude with a general observation about the limitations of political means of advancing the interests of any ethnic group.

As Samuel Lubell and Daniel Bell both emphasized in their analysis of the social mobility of immigrant ethnic groups in the United States, the first prerequisite for the advancement of any group is that it should develop its own leaders. The role of political parties or governments in this regard ought not to be overlooked; but voluntary associations which use the language of the minority are of particular importance. Thus, in New Brunswick, we noted the importance of the Roman Catholic Church, of the Société Nationale des Acadiens, the Société l'Assomption, the Caisses Populaires, etc., in producing people who are capable of holding positions in the business world and in the civil service. The activities of these organizations suggest that in developing individual competence and political skills, the experience provided to members of an ethnic group through their own voluntary associations is of vital

importance.¹

The necessity of developing indigenous leaders applies equally to an ethnic group enjoying a numerical majority, as it does to an ethnic minority like the Acadians in New Brunswick. For example, in Quebec, the attempt to challenge the economic power of the English-speaking minority had little prospect of success as long as French-Canadians lacked the skills to run their own economy.²

¹I do not wish to imply that voluntary associations are the only organizations of relevance in this respect. Political parties have a special interest in promoting members of ethnic minorities to executive positions in their own ranks, although (as we have noted above) the advance of such individuals within the party depends to some extent on their skill in the language of the majority--as also in voluntary associations of mixed membership. Secondly: governmental action, if it promotes the structural assimilation of the minority, is also (obviously) of cardinal importance--the more so because, if it is known that senior positions are available to members of the minority, this knowledge provides additional incentive to the individual to acquire skills which he might otherwise regard as superfluous. If Bell and Lubell are correct, however, in thinking that the first prerequisite for the minority is the development of its own leaders, then government action can do no more than reinforce a social development initiated in other ways.

²It would be interesting to explore this lead as a possible explanation for the virtual abandonment of the economic nationalism of the Action Liberale Nationale program, during the early years of the Duplessis regime. One could argue that lack of support from a French-Canadian economic elite made the proposals of the 1936 platform impossible to achieve.

In general: the potential political power of an ethnic group--majority or minority--cannot be realized without effective leadership. Even a group which does possess political power cannot use it to full advantage if its members lack the managerial and technical skills to occupy the positions which are opened to them by political means. To recognize this fact is to recognize an inevitable limitation in the effectiveness of political solutions to the problems of an ethnic group.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

In the introduction to this study we discussed two ways in which the activities of political parties may conduce to the cohesion of a political community. First, parties may engender support for the regime and for the political community by helping to make the political system responsive to the social needs and, political demands of the members of the political community. Second, parties may attenuate stress on the system by reducing the number of demands which are placed upon it--eliminating especially those demands which are potentially disruptive.

Demand-reduction is an essential ingredient in the processes promoting the cohesion of political communities, because no system can satisfy all politically-relevant wants of its members. On the other hand, excessive demand-reduction can be damaging to the cohesion of the political community, because a group's support for the regime and ultimately for the political community can be retained only if the system meets what the group considers to be its minimal or irreducible demands.

In Part One we considered a threat to the cohesion of the Canadian political community arising from the fact that demand-reduction in relation to the wants of French-Canadians is decreasingly effective as a means of attenuating stress on the Canadian political system. Discontent

(we observed) has manifested itself in spite of the fact that symbolic achievements and palliatives were employed in an attempt to secure the support of French-Canadians for the regime and the political community. We then posed the question whether changes in the structure and activities of political parties could succeed in increasing the responsiveness of the system. It seemed advisable to examine not only the role of political parties but also that of voluntary associations in articulating the interests of different groups--a question which remained at the forefront of our attention in the three constituency studies.

In Part Two we shifted our attention away from possible changes in the structure and activities of political parties, and considered how the content of specific categories of demands formulated by an ethnic minority might adversely affect the chances of their being realized. We noted that the minority must avoid becoming politically isolated--that is, it must avoid provoking the mobilization of the majority against its demands; and we argued that this danger effectively limits the political tactics which may be employed. If this limitation is a serious one, then a second threat to Canadian unity arises from the probable failure, even in the long run, of the Canadian political system to respond to the minimal or irreducible demands of French-speaking Canadians. In this case the threat arises, not from the inadequacy of parties and voluntary associations

as structural mechanisms for the articulation of interests, but from the nature of the demands themselves, and the reaction to them by the English-speaking majority.

It is the object of this concluding chapter to discuss the seriousness of each of the two threats to Canadian unity. Our consideration of possible changes in the structure and activities of political parties will involve a review of the findings of the constituency studies, and some discussion of their significance in the light of the small amount of comparative material which is available.

Secondly, in order to discuss whether the content of the demands formulated by French-Canadians militate against their realization through the political system, it will be necessary to estimate how crippling it is to French-Canadians, as an ethnic minority, to be restricted in the political tactics which they can afford to employ.

In so doing, we shall draw on the conclusions emerging from Part One concerning the relative effectiveness of political parties and voluntary associations in performing the interest-articulation function.

* * *

As was pointed out in the first chapter of this study, parties in democratic regimes are often thought to contribute to the responsiveness of the system. It was subsequently argued (Chapter II) that for many years parties

in Quebec, rather than increasing the responsiveness of the system in the manner often ascribed to them, enabled governments to acquire and retain power in spite of their implementing policies inimical to the material interests of the majority of people in the province. The parties had mobilized electoral support by stressing the symbolic achievements of the regime and by distributing the palliatives of patronage and public works. When, subsequently, the conviction spread that the provincial government had allied itself with (in Falardeau's words) "...les formes les plus abusives du patronat américain et québécois,"¹ and that the federal government had excluded French-Canadians from full participation in the formulation of federal policies (particularly in economic affairs). French-Canadians began to insist that the system be made more responsive to their social needs and political demands. There also arose the feeling that structural changes in the regime or even dissolution of the political community might be necessary in order to achieve this end. There remains substantial disagreement amongst French-Canadians on these matters.

This is not the place to consider possible changes in the constitutional jurisdiction of the provinces or reform of political institutions at the federal level; but it is

¹Quoted above, p. 58.

incumbent upon us, in a study devoted to the role of parties in promoting the cohesion of the political community, to examine both their present and their potential role in making the system responsive to social needs and political demands.

Our analysis necessarily distinguishes between different categories of interest. We shall distinguish between the interests of (a) individuals and individual localities, and (b) the interests of various groupings as defined by a variety of characteristics such as occupation, income, residence (region, size of community), or personal characteristics (age, sex, ethnicity, educational qualifications).

System responsiveness to local and personal interests.

Those interests which are most easily perceived and consequently most easily converted into political demands are the interests of individuals and of individual localities, as exemplified by requests for allocations in the form of welfare payments, employment, government contracts, or public works. As we have already noted, certain such allocations are made by a professional bureaucracy and in accordance with bureaucratic norms which leave little discretion regarding their application to individual cases. Other allocations are made, within a rather greater margin of discretion, by political figures (patronage-admini-

stration).

With the exception of certain categories of allocation, such as statutory welfare benefits, there is normally competition between individuals and localities to obtain government grants, jobs, or contracts. For an individual or a locality to be able to enter the competition, adequate channels must exist for the transmission of requests to the appropriate politician or official. Consequently, those who lack access, whether through unfamiliarity with bureaucratic procedure or from want of "connections", stand little or no chance of obtaining recognition of their political interests as individuals or localities. This is particularly true for those allocations which are made by political rather than by civil service personnel.

It appeared from the constituency studies that local party organizations were well equipped, by their structure and by the interests and abilities of their personnel, to provide public access to the authorities regarding requests for allocations. Whether the allocations were made by civil servants or by political figures, the party personnel were available and anxious to help by channelling requests to the appropriate authorities; for minor matters they even exercised a measure of authority on their own. Indeed, it will be recalled that in all three constituencies the activities of greatest interest to party workers, apart

from the organizing of elections, were: (a) helping people to obtain social welfare payments and otherwise acting as a mediator between them and the government bureaucracy, (b) distributing the patronage or obtaining private employment for people who came to them for help, and (c) taking minor administrative decisions such as, in the rural areas, deciding on the location of county roads.

Elected Members were the key individuals in the performance of these activities, and they were generally assiduous in obtaining public works or other grants for their constituencies. In Westmorland we even saw that the volume of patronage matters, and their importance to the M.L.A. as a means of controlling his party organization, resulted in an informal territorial division of the county for administrative (i.e. patronage) purposes. Moreover the apparent influence exercised by Members in placing trusted individuals in key positions in the riding organization--whether the positions were filled by election or by general agreement amongst the party activists, or by appointment--had the advantage of creating an organization which could work effectively with the Member in performing his allocative duties. In all three constituencies, the riding organizations facilitated the maintenance of contact between the Member and his constituents, in respect of individual requests, problems, and grievances.

It is inevitable, in view of the competition for government allocations, that the interests of some individuals are furthered at the expense of others. In the case of patronage allocations and grants of public works, there is also the possibility that the interests of certain individuals or localities will be overridden because of partisan considerations. Thus there is bound to be, even under the best of circumstances, a certain amount of discontent arising from failure to obtain what one considers to be one's fair share of the government largesse.

Let us suppose there is fairly widespread discontent arising from what is thought to be an inadequate volume or unfair distribution of government allocations. Would such discontent be likely to pose a very serious threat to the cohesion of the political community? It would seem not. This statement is based in part on the fact that individuals or localities cannot realistically threaten to secede from the political community; in part it is based on the presumption that discontent of this kind is more likely to be focussed on the authorities or (in relatively extreme cases) on the regime, rather than on the political community. In the first place, the promise and prospect of redress of one's grievances may generally be obtained, if not from the authorities, then from competitors for political office. Thus discontent, at least in the short run, is likely to be directed at the authorities. In the second

place, even if there is prolonged failure of the political system to realize individual demands, such failure might well engender demands for changing the method of making allocations; but there is no reason for supposing that discontent arising from even widespread and prolonged failure to meet personal and local political demands would give rise to agitation for the dissolution of the political community.

More serious consequences for the cohesion of the political community, however, may be expected if it is thought that there is discrimination against a group as a whole, such as an ethnic group. Perception of such discrimination, whether accurate or not, is more likely to provoke separatist sentiment; indeed, apparent discrimination against members of a group is simply one instance of perceived failure by the political system to respond to the demands of the group. In this way support for the regime and the political community may be reduced, perhaps drastically so.

Since failure to respond to the needs and demands of major groups is more potentially disruptive than similar failure in relation to the interests of individuals or localities, the three constituency studies were concerned largely with the role of parties in increasing the responsiveness of the system to group interests, as defined by characteristics such as income, occupation, or ethnic

origin.

System responsiveness to group interests.

One fact which emerged from the brief descriptions of the constituencies studied was that in each one, problems have arisen which cannot be conjured away simply by treating cases of individual hardship or by expending public funds in the constituency (for instance by building fishing-wharves or transportation facilities). Solutions to problems such as instability of employment and low wages, both of which affect a large proportion of the labour force in each of the three constituencies, require a broad program of action involving several aspects of government policy including resources development, education, transport, labour, agriculture, and social security. While it is possible to approach a problem such as the decline of farm revenues by finding road-work for sub-marginal farmers or building a four-months-a-year local sawmill so they can work their woodlots, such actions are palliatives which benefit individual persons or localities, but do not much affect people outside the immediate district. They cannot do more than alleviate some of the symptoms of the problem.

What do political parties do, or what could they be expected to do, to increase the responsiveness of the political system to the needs and demands of geographically-dispersed groups? In Chapter I it was shown that our con-

cern with the responsiveness of the system would necessarily lead us to enquire into the effectiveness of parties in performing the representation-of-interests function (communication between the authorities and the members of the political community, mobilization of electoral majorities behind enunciated policies, and articulation of otherwise-unorganized interests).¹

One of the conclusions which may be drawn from the constituency studies is that the effective representation of certain categories of political interest cannot be accomplished by political parties alone, but requires action by voluntary associations, either in concert with political parties or independently of them. The argument supporting this conclusion will be reviewed in the following paragraphs.

Many of the problems with which we were concerned in the constituency studies are not amenable to solution by the state alone. On the contrary, in many instances it appeared that the most effective way of contributing to the well-being of disadvantaged sectors of the population was through co-operation between the state and other organizations.

Let us take, by way of example, the problems of low wages and underemployment. On the one hand, trade unions

¹Above p. 6.

may negotiate with employers to stabilize the labour market and raise wages, thereby serving the interests of their members; but the conditions under which they do so, their structure, and their very existence depend in large measure on the policy of the state as expressed both in legislation and administrative action. Similarly, a policy of industrial development generally requires co-operation between the state and privately-owned firms. Other policy-areas relevant to alleviating the problems of low wages and underemployment are more wholly the responsibility of the state--education and transport, for example: although even here the planning and execution of new directions in policy require consultation and support from private or semi-private organizations.

Perhaps the clearest example of the necessity of co-operation between the state and other organizations is in the area of controlling prices and volume of farm (or fisheries products, where the state would find it virtually impossible to step in without the prior existence of a widely-based producers' organization to propagandize and help to implement the idea of compulsory marketing and production quotas, both of which limit the freedom of the individual producer. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that voluntary associations lack the powers to deal adequately with the problems of underemployment and low wages without having recourse to the state.

In view of the necessary co-operation between voluntary associations and the state in dealing with problems such as low wages and underemployment, the political interests of the groups most directly concerned cannot be articulated satisfactorily except through action by voluntary associations.¹ Hence, two questions:

To what extent are political parties and voluntary associations alternative structural mechanisms for the representation of interests, and to what extent are they complementary ones?

If, by empirical observation, parties and voluntary associations appear to be alternative mechanisms for the representation of interests, what is the relative importance of each, in relation to different categories of interest?

The findings of our constituency studies in relation to these two questions may be summarized as follows. At the local level, parties and voluntary associations appeared to be alternative rather than complementary structures for the representation of interests. Indeed, there was some evidence to suggest that there has been occurring a specialization of interest-articulation structures, with parties articulating the interests of individuals and localities while voluntary associations articulate the interests of geographically-dispersed groups. There was

¹ Thus in the constituency studies it was necessary to examine the political (not necessarily partisan) role of several voluntary associations, if only to identify and describe the political interests of their members. For example, to have discussed the political interests of the farmers of Westmorland without reference to the New Brunswick Federation of Agriculture would have been unsatisfactory if not impossible.

a readily apparent lack of collaboration between parties and voluntary associations, at least at the local level, in representing group interests.

The constituency studies revealed that the two most common patterns of interest-articulation through voluntary associations were as follows:

(a) The initiative came from provincial or regional headquarters, with demands being formulated by headquarters personnel. Local units were requested to discuss the proposals emanating from headquarters and to pass appropriate resolutions, either drafting their own or endorsing ones drafted at more senior levels. We had no way of telling to what extent the purpose of this procedure was simply to mobilize support for already-firm proposals, and to what extent the provincial or regional office hoped for criticisms and suggestions in order to make any necessary modifications in the original proposals. In any case, the resolutions were to be forwarded to headquarters, generally discussed in convention, and then incorporated into a brief to the cabinet. This procedure was used for either establishing or endorsing the major policy-objectives of the association.

(b) On matters of more immediate or local concern,

the leaders of voluntary associations preferred to establish contact directly with civil service personnel or ministers. In some cases they obtained the help of the local Member to make the initial contact, but the Member's subsequent involvement generally appeared to be slight. The local party organization was entirely bypassed.

These patterns of interest-articulation were in keeping with the "non-political" (actually non-partisan) stance of the leaders of those voluntary associations with which we were concerned in our constituency studies. This stance minimized the contacts between leaders of these voluntary associations and local political figures, and resulted in complete absence of collaboration between voluntary associations and local political parties in articulating group interests.

The lack of contact between party personnel and the leaders of voluntary associations was most obvious in St. Henri, where the new working-class leaders in the citizens' committees were disgusted with the political in-fighting which they observed between parties, and were emphatically non-partisan in orientation, even though they were closely concerned with the activities of governments, especially the municipal government.

In Brome-Missisquoi and Westmorland we did not observe the same degree of hostility towards party activists, but

there was nevertheless a general tendency amongst leaders of certain voluntary associations to avoid political involvement at the constituency level. To some extent this was due to fear that they might inevitably become identified with one or other of the parties, and that this would have adverse effects on their own organizations. Partisan jealousies, if carried over into their own organizations, would have disruptive consequences, in the same way as might religious disputes.

Fear of the disruptive consequences of partisanship stance of those voluntary associations which were concerned with interest-articulation; but there are two other factors which are probably equally important.

The first of these is the general prevalence--shared, it seems, by partisans and the leaders of voluntary associations--of the notion that the role of the elected Member is to obtain allocations for his constituency, that is, to articulate the interests of individuals and localities, but not really to act as a legislator. In the latter capacity he might be expected to articulate the interests of geographically-dispersed groups; but the performance of legislative duties seemed on the whole to occasion less interest or concern than what the Member could do for his constituency.

The final factor which may be invoked to explain the absence of collaboration between voluntary associations and



political parties at the constituency level in promoting the interests of geographically-dispersed groups is a marked divergence in political attitudes between the personnel of the two kinds of organization. Party activists were interested primarily in activities which clearly contributed to the representation of individual and local interests; but they appeared to conceive of government allocations as favours, for which the appropriate method of distribution was the discretionary patronage method, in which (of course) they had a prominent role. In this way they encouraged acceptance of government paternalism, even if they themselves, occupying a position on the fringes of the state apparatus, were not equally subject to its arbitrary benevolence. On the other hand the leaders of voluntary associations whom we interviewed were quite unwilling to place themselves in the position of suppliants before a benefactor: no longer did they regard the state as Providence succumbed to the peccata mundi. Thus they conceived of the relationship between the individual and the state in quite a different way than did most of the party activists. Since the individual's conception of the relationship between himself and the state affects the kinds of demands which he is likely to formulate, and also the tactics used in attempting to obtain satisfaction for his demands, the divergence in political attitudes between local party activists and leaders of voluntary

associations made it difficult if not impossible for them to collaborate in promoting the interests of geographically-dispersed groups.

What are the consequences of the apparent lack of collaboration between parties and voluntary associations in representing the interests of geographically-dispersed groups?

In approaching this question we must bear in mind that political decisions are made within the context of perpetual conflict between rival interests, and that political decision-makers cannot afford to ignore the eventual electoral consequences of their actions. I do not wish to suggest that decisions are invariably taken on the basis of calculated electoral advantage; nevertheless, the estimation of probable electoral repercussions of alternative lines of action is an essential aspect of the decision-making process. The political authorities, for this reason, cannot afford to make decisions solely according to their personal judgment as to what would constitute the most adequate response to social needs--or even, in many cases, in accordance with majority political demands. Majority demands may be outweighed by intense opposition from a minority, especially if it possesses advantages giving it special power to influence decisions--perhaps because of wealth, expertise, status, or access.

From these observations we may infer that the responsiveness of the system requires, amongst other things, the mobilization of popular support for policies which may be detrimental to the interests of powerful groups or individuals. Moreover, effective representation of the interests of groups which are numerically large but not otherwise powerful (from wealth, expertise, or other factors), requires more than the mere voicing of demands. It requires also some means of demonstrating to the authorities how much popular support--both in numbers and in intensity of feeling--lies behind the demands. This is a necessary inference from the fact that decision-makers, particularly cabinet ministers, must determine policy at least partly in keeping with their assessment of interested opinion on the matter, and that they must weight their judgment according to intensity of opinion on an issue rather than simply calculate numerical majorities.

If, therefore, an association makes policy representations to a Minister or even to a civil servant, the weight of its representations will vary according to the degree of support of which it can give evidence. Support may be evidenced by a variety of means--passing resolutions at annual meetings, mass demonstrations, petitions, or a wide range of publicity measures. These may be very effectively supplemented, however, by using the local Member as a channel for the transmission of demands.

There is no surer guarantee that demands will be carefully listened to than if a Member convinces his party leader, whether at the head of the Government or in opposition, that the seat will be lost if the party does not respond favourably to them. Moreover, party activists may fulfill a similar role. In those constituencies which are held by the opposition, if activists in the Government party are able to report reliably on the probable electoral consequences of different policy options, such advice could be expected to influence government decisions.

Indeed, reports from the constituencies carry a special significance for political leaders, since electoral repercussions of policy decisions are determined not only by the number of people most directly affected by a given decision, but by their spatial distribution: the number of seats, not only the number of votes, is critical in determining electoral victory or defeat.

For this reason it would be strongly advantageous to voluntary associations if they could obtain the collaboration of political parties, at all levels, in articulating the political interests of their members. Presumably they would do so without themselves becoming partisan organizations, although the parties also would have to become more receptive to this kind of relationship.

Voluntary associations would not be the only ones to benefit from closer contact with political parties.

Advantages would accrue to the parties also if they were to undertake a rapprochement with voluntary associations at all levels, without however involving them in strictly partisan affairs. At the present time, as I have already indicated, the channels of interest-articulation tend to bypass at least the lower ranks of political parties, so far as the interests of geographically-dispersed groups are concerned. Moreover, to an increasing extent, voluntary associations appear to work out policies in conjunction with civil service personnel, or to negotiate with the cabinet in order to achieve their objectives. Thus there is a tendency of voluntary associations to take over from political parties an increasingly-large part of the interest-articulation function, and this tendency could be expected to be reinforced by the increasing technicality of many areas of policy, where the parties have not competent personnel--probably not even at the more senior levels.

We may infer, then, that to prevent their own partial eclipse by voluntary associations, the parties would find it to their advantage to collaborate with voluntary associations in articulating the interests of geographically-dispersed groups. This would be simply a matter of institutional self-preservation.

As I have argued however, there is little prospect of collaboration between local party organizations and voluntary associations in representing group interests, unless

and until the parties succeed in reforming their structures and reorienting their activities. I should like to supplement this argument by quoting some remarks by Professor Vincent Lemieux, speaking to the assises of the Union Nationale in March 1965. On this occasion Professor Lemieux proposed a reform of party structures and activities in order to increase the party's sensitivity to the problems of the milieu:

Reprenons notre exemple des politiques de l'éducation....Les problèmes de l'éducation sont trop complexes pour pouvoir être expliqués par des militants éduqués en serre chaude selon la bonne doctrine du parti, et qui voient tous les problèmes politiques dans cette perspective restreinte.

Ce n'est que par des contacts avec les groupes qui vivent professionnellement ou autrement ces problèmes de l'éducation: les instituteurs, les directeurs et administrateurs d'écoles, les commissions scolaires, les comités de planification etc, que les militants des partis politiques peuvent s'en faire une idée suffisamment nette, pour ensuite prendre position et tenter d'éclairer les électeurs. Même chose pour ce qui est de l'industrialisation, du développement régional, des problèmes agricoles: ce n'est que par des contacts avec les groupes spécialisés dans ces questions, que par des discussions organisées ou non avec eux que les partis pourront permettre à un nouveau type de militants, qui ne seront ni de simples travailleurs d'élection, ni des endoctrinés, de s'informer suffisamment des problèmes de plus en plus complexes et techniques qui se présenteront. Et ces contacts rempliront la triple fonction de montrer le sérieux des partis auprès des groupes consultés, de permettre au parti d'élaborer un programme plus solide, et de pouvoir répondre aux questions que se posent de plus en plus des électeurs mieux informés, mais à qui il manque certaines connaissances de base pour comprendre tout à fait ce dont il s'agit.¹

It is implicit in the concluding part of this excerpt from Professor Lemieux' remarks that electoral advantages might ensue from a reform of constituency party structures and activities. This view also gains credence, but for different reasons, from our study of St. Henri. It will be recalled that in this study we argued that a substantial part of the support for the R.I.N. in the 1966 election may well have been due to public disillusionment with the continual in-fighting between the older parties. Moreover, the Liberal Party's defeat appears to have been caused partly by the internal dissension in the party due to the undemocratic method of renominating the candidate. The Liberals' defeat and the reasonably good showing of the R.I.N. in St. Henri may be interpreted, therefore, as an example of the electoral dangers which confront parties which fail to reform their structures and activities as appropriate to changes in the social structure and political attitudes.

Nevertheless, whatever the advantages to parties in

Paper read to the assises of the Union Nationale, March 20, 1965; Cité Libre v. 15, No 81 (Octobre 1965), pp. 19-20. Professor Lemieux stated that with these objectives in mind, the Union Nationale should abandon both the "parti de cadres" and the "parti de masse" notions, and opt for a "parti d'animateurs" in which the relatively small number of party members would participate in the activities of non-partisan organizations in order to understand the problems which faced these organizations, and the society at large.

reforming their structures and undertaking policy-oriented activities, there is clear empirical evidence that many party organizers have resisted these developments.

Instances of dissidence within party ranks as a result of the diminution of patronage may be found in our study of Brome-Missisquoi, and in other studies referred to in Chapter II. We may hypothesize, then, that if the democratization of parties makes any real headway, it will probably be only over the long run, as the key personnel in the constituencies are replaced.

Indeed, the prospects for such a development would be very good if there were not, in addition to internal resistance, external pressures for continuation of the traditional activities, and hence for the preservation of structures similar to the ones we encountered in the constituency studies.

In the long run the obstacles to such reforms of party structures and activities may well prove to be, not opposition from within the parties themselves, but the volume of demands for the services traditionally performed by party personnel. The classic statement of this point of view is contained in R.K. Merton's study of the functions of political machines: "...the political machine [Merton writes] persists as an apparatus for satisfying otherwise unfulfilled needs of diverse groups in the population"¹

¹R.K. Merton, "Manifest and Latent Functions," in his Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), p. 73

In Merton's analysis, the political machine provides social assistance which is more effective in some respects than the legalized assistance provided by professional social workers and bureaucratic administrators of state welfare programs; for business, "...the political boss serves the function of providing those political privileges which entail immediate economic gains;"¹ while for aspirants to social mobility it provides an avenue of social ascent when others may be closed, as for example as a result of ethnic discrimination.²

It is a matter of some contention amongst students of political party organization, whether the traditional political machines are being squeezed out of existence by a diminution in "resources" (i.e. patronage) and a simultaneous decline in demands for the traditional services.

Several writers have hailed the demise of machine politics in the United States, attributing it primarily to a long-term increase in prosperity which has made patronage jobs relatively less attractive, and to the extension of social security measures--both developments tending to reduce the volume of demands for the services

¹Ibid., p. 75

²Ibid., pp. 76-7.

of the classic political machine.¹ It is also added by some writers that there is a greater tendency among the electorate to use one's vote to express opinions on major issues rather than to exchange it for immediate rewards.²

On the other hand, the continuing dependence of lower-class groups on the services of the political machine is also acknowledged. Thus Fred I. Greenstein, reviewing several studies of constituency politics in the United States, alludes to the existence of ideologically-motivated "new-style reformers" within constituency party organizations, but comments:

It is where material resources available to the parties are limited, for example, California, and where voter interest in these resources is low, that the new reformers are successful. In practice, however, the latter condition has confined the effectiveness of the reform Democrats largely to the more prosperous sections of cities; neither their style nor their programs seem to be successful in lower-class districts....In many cities, the reformers' clientele is progressively diminishing as higher-income citizens

¹Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and the M.I.T. Press, 1963), pp. 121-2; Fred I. Greenstein, "The Changing Patterns of Urban Party Politics." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (hereinafter cited as The Annals), v. 353 (May 1964), pp. 7-9; Elmer E. Cornwell, "Bosses, Machines, and Ethnic Groups," The Annals, v. 353, (May 1964), p. 34; William C. Harvard, "From Bossism to Cosmopolitanism," The Annals, v. 353 (May 1964), pp. 87-8; Frank J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System ("Basic Studies in Politics;" Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1964), pp. 53-7.

²Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., p. 122; Cornwell, op. cit., p. 35.

move outward to the suburbs. Therefore, though fascinating and illuminating, the new reform movement must at least for the moment be considered as little more than a single manifestation in a panorama of urban political practices....

The degree to which old-style urban party organizations will continue to be a part of this panorama is uncertain. Changes in the social composition of the cities promise to be a major factor in the future of urban politics. If, as seems possible, many cities become lower-class, nonwhite enclaves, we can be confident that there will be a continuing market for the services of the service-oriented old-style politician....¹

Similarly, Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, declare that, "...the final extinction of the machine is probably guaranteed; "but they base their prediction on the assumption that, "...the middle class will in the very long run assimilate the lower class entirely...." They add: "Meanwhile, there remain enclaves that are heavily lower-class in all of the central cities and many of the older suburbs. In these, machine-style politics is as popular as ever."²

As a general proposition, it may be asserted that dependency on the services provided by a political machine, or by the politician who acts as a mediator between the individual and the bureaucracy, correlates closely with economic deprivation. As Elmer E. Cornwell has written:

Whatever else may be said about the conditions and forces that spawned the classic machine, this kind of disciplined political entity must

¹Greenstein, op. cit., p. 13.

²Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., p. 123.

rest at bottom on a clientele which has felt it necessary to exchange political independence--its votes, in a word--for something seen as more essential to its well-being and security. In general, such a group will be the product of some kind of socioeconomic disequilibrium or cultural tension which finds its members in an insecure or seriously disadvantaged situation.¹

Our own observations in each of the three constituencies corroborated this statement.

If, as a result of the perpetuation of economic insecurity or of an otherwise "seriously disadvantaged situation" amongst a sizeable sector of the population, demands for the services traditionally performed by politicians continue in virtually unabated volume, the parties could be expected to go on responding as they have done in the past: by rendering these services through organizational structures adapted to this role but ill-equipped to undertake policy-oriented activities. Hence our earlier suggestion that there has been occurring a specialization of interest-articulation structures, with parties articulating the interests of individuals and localities, while voluntary associations articulate the interests of geographically-dispersed groups.

As I have already observed, the failure of voluntary associations and political parties to co-operate in representing group interests cannot but render the political

¹Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., op. cit., p. 29.

system less responsive to the interests articulated by voluntary associations. This is especially true of the interests of groups which may be numerically large but are not otherwise powerful.

Indeed, those voluntary associations which are likely to be most effective as pressure groups are the ones which have more than the resource of numbers at their disposal. Associations which also wield resources enabling them to bargain with the government between elections are placed at an advantage by comparison with those which can raise only the ultimate electoral threat of non-support--and often not very convincingly. For example, a professional organization such as a medical association or a public transport union possess a very strong bargaining counter, in that withdrawal of its services is damaging to the public and is almost certain to give rise to public outcry that the government accede to the group's demands. By contrast, a consumers' association has no political bargaining counters other than the rather distant and unconvincing electoral sanction.

The specialization of interest-articulation structures also makes it very difficult for unorganized groups, or rather for others on their behalf, to promote their political interests against opposition from powerful interests. This does not rule out governmental adoption of policies which favour unorganized groups, but it does

suggest that the responsiveness of the political system to the social needs and the feebly-articulated demands of unorganized groups is likely to be quite limited.

Even if we have discerned limitations, not only on the role of parties in contributing to the responsiveness of the system to social needs, but on the actual responsiveness of the system (by whatever structural mechanisms), it is unlikely that such limitations pose a serious threat to the cohesion of the political community.

Let us recall the analysis (in Chapter II) of the sources of the present threat to the cohesion of the Canadian political community. There it was argued that demand-reduction is decreasingly effective in alleviating stress on the political system, partly because of the increasing dependence of many French-Canadians on the state (a situation conducive to the formulation of new demands), and partly because the formulation of new demands, or more insistent demands, was encouraged by newly-emerging elites within French-Canadian society. In other words, an essential ingredient in the challenge to the existing order, as earlier in the Canadian West, has been the presence of effective leadership. The new leaders have wielded their influence through the universities, the provincial civil service, and a variety of voluntary associations; and they have had also an evident influence within the upper ranks of the political parties and in

the provincial cabinet.

Thus, if French-Canadians have formulated new minimal demands, this development has had potentially disruptive effects on the Canadian political system at least partly because the demands have been articulated by groups which are acquiring an increasingly prominent place in French-Canadian society. Social groups whose political demands were long muted have found effective leadership and the institutional means of exercising it.

It also appears that the emergence of more powerful voluntary associations has been instrumental in modifying the composition of French-Canadian elites: voluntary associations have opened new channels by which one may accede to leadership positions. Thus it seems quite within the range of possibility that the social tensions accompanying a period of rapid circulation of elites in French-Canadian society may be attenuated after a time, and the parties retain their dual role of (a) mobilizing support for a regime which serves the interests of the dominant groups, and (b) attenuating stress on the system by the familiar method: demand-reduction supplemented by the distribution of palliatives.

What emerges from the preceding discussion is a new optic on our assessment of the role of parties in promoting the cohesion of the Canadian political community. We have arrived at a rather equivocal estimate of the potential

role of parties in increasing the responsiveness of the political system to social needs and political demands, thereby generating support for the regime and the political community. Their role in increasing the responsiveness of the system is especially limited in the case of unorganized groups, and may not in the foreseeable future become significantly greater in this respect.

On the other hand, parties did show themselves to be assiduous in promoting the interests of individuals and localities, and their role in obtaining government allocations for their constituents could be expected to reduce stress on the system provided it meets the minimal or irreducible demands of the larger and more powerful groups.

Our analysis of the structure and activities of parties, however, indicates that they cannot be expected in the near future to make a major contribution to the responsiveness of the system. I do not mean to say that electoral competition between aspirants for public office fails to increase the responsiveness of the political system to the needs and demands of the members of the political community; but I do mean that among the various structural mechanisms which play a part in representing political interests, the political party is not very effective, under present conditions, in representing certain categories of interest. By comparison, voluntary

associations did appear to be a reasonably effective organizational tool for the expression of the new social forces which, as was described in Chapter II, have been emerging in French Canada and are articulating new and apparently rather inflexible political demands.

* * *

A point which underlay the whole of the preceding discussion is that political decisions are not necessarily taken in accordance with the interests of the majority, or even of the majority of those who have an opinion on the question at hand. Intensity of feeling on an issue is as important to political decision-makers as the calculation of numerical majorities. Moreover, there are other components of political power than the ability to cast votes for or against the government; wealth is the outstanding example. Thus, in a political regime based on competition between aspirants for public office, the interests of minorities are continually, if partially, being met - even at the expense of the majority. Robert Dahl has written:

Elections and political competition do not make for government by majorities in any very significant way, but they vastly increase the size, number, and variety of minorities whose preferences must be taken into account by leaders in making policy choices. I am inclined to think that it is in this characteristic of elections--not minority rule but minorities rule--that we must look for some of the essential differences between

dictatorships and democracies.¹

The question arises, however: within a democratic regime, are certain minorities placed at a disadvantage not experienced by other minorities in attempting to obtain recognition of their political interests? If so, the system may not respond adequately to even the minimal political demands of the minorities concerned, thus weakening support for the authorities, the regime, and the political community.

Specifically, we are interested to know whether the minimal demands formulated by French-speaking Canadians may be realized under a regime which is based upon representation by population. Some fragments of an answer to this question may be elicited from the analysis in Part Two of this study.

It is not intended here to discuss the consequences of the federal distribution of powers in Canada. Rather, our attention is directed to the role of French-Canadians in federal politics.

Members of an ethnic group may formulate political demands related to their ethnicity, and others which are not. Of the former, we identified in Part Two, two main sorts: those tending towards structural assimilation

¹Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, ("Phoenix Books;" Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 132.

within the society as a whole (i.e., removing the ethnic impediment to social mobility), and those aiming to protect the ethnic group against behavioural assimilation (i.e. demands envisaging the perpetuation of a culturally distinctive entity). In addition to these "ethnic demands" there are demands formulated by members of an ethnic group, but not related to their ethnicity--demands concerning the position of the individual as a member of a given occupation--group, age-group, or other non-ethnic category.

We have already completed our analysis of the responsiveness of the political system to non-ethnic demands, and we shall not consider them further.

The analysis in Part Two suggested that there are greater obstacles to the realization of demands for protection against behavioural assimilation than to demands for structural assimilation. It was argued that an ethnic minority if it is sufficiently large, may effectively promote its own structural assimilation by concentrating its support behind one political party, but that the same tactic is likely to provoke the mobilization of the majority against its demands for protection against behavioural assimilation. The reasoning, very briefly, was that in having recourse to the one-party tactic to support demands for protection against behavioural assimilation the minority might unwittingly encourage another party to

seek to augment its electoral support by putting itself at the head of the majority, in opposition to minority demands.

The difference between the two types of demand lies chiefly in the degree of their "visibility"--that is, of the ease with which they may be perceived as benefiting only the ethnic minority. The one-party tactic is most likely to be successful in cases where its contribution to the interests of the minority can be camouflaged, as in the case of individual administrative decisions which, in the aggregate, may promote the structural assimilation of the ethnic minority. Where it is clearly evident, however, that the interests of the minority are being favoured, perhaps to the detriment of the majority or some members of the majority--the extreme case being legislation to guarantee language rights or other aspects of the minority culture--the one-party tactic would leave the minority in dangerously vulnerable position.

The fact that ethnic minorities cannot afford to employ the one-party tactic to establish barriers to behavioural assimilation does not necessarily imply that this goal cannot be achieved within a regime based on political competition and representation by population.

It must be emphasized that in Part Two we discussed the role of parties in promoting the interests of ethnic minorities; we did not analyze the importance of electoral

competition in increasing the responsiveness of the system to their demands. We now ask: can an ethnic minority, by using structural mechanisms other than political parties to articulate demands for protection against behavioural assimilation, obtain a favourable response from the authorities, even within a regime based on representation by population?

It is not possible to offer a concrete answer to this question, since in every instance several factors must be considered: the size of the minority, its social structure and aggregate wealth, its leadership resources--and most important, the attitudes of the majority. Nevertheless, a formal answer will provide some clues. Briefly, intensity of feeling amongst the minority on the subject of its demands may overcome opposition from within a majority which is relatively indifferent.

Let us suppose such a climate of opinion. According to our previous analysis, it would be dangerous for the minority to seek protection against behavioural assimilation by employing the one-party tactic, because another major party might attempt to raise the intensity of opposition to minority demands. The minority may, however, articulate its demands through other structural mechanisms, notably voluntary associations, with some prospect of success in evoking a favourable governmental response. The likelihood of such a response would, no doubt, be enhanced if there were continuing contact between leaders of the

ethnic group and the top-ranking personnel of both (or all) major parties, especially if members of the ethnic group constitute an important segment of the electoral support of each. In this case, the party leaders would be politically motivated--in direct ratio to the amount of support the party obtains from members of the group--to respond favourably to ethnic demands, while simultaneously dampening criticism within their own party.

Such an occurrence is wholly within the range of possibility, provided that within the majority only a relatively small number of people are strongly opposed to the demands of the ethnic minority, and a rather larger number of people either relatively indifferent or even sympathetic towards the protection of the minority's distinctive culture. In these circumstances, a party with a substantial amount of support from the minority could be expected to try either to retain or augment that support by responding favourably to its demands while "selling" to the majority the necessity, reasonableness, or generosity of their response. Although there would be little prospect of success in this endeavour as far as the vitally-concerned and strongly-hostile part of the majority is concerned, the party would still find it advantageous to adopt this stance if it could reasonably expect to gain or hold more support from members of the ethnic minority than it could expect to lose from the

strongly-opposed portion of the ethnic majority.

It is not within the scope of the present study to analyze the content of French-Canadian demands within the Canadian political system, and the attitudes of English-speaking Canadians to them. The foregoing remarks do, however, suggest a final comment on the role of parties in promoting Canadian unity, with reference to (a) increasing the responsiveness of the system to the needs and demands of major groups, and (b) attenuating stress on the system by the process of demand-reduction.

In the case of ethnic demands, as in the case of non-ethnic demands, we have arrived at a rather limited estimate of the role of parties in increasing the responsiveness of the system. While parties do appear to constitute an effective structural mechanism for the realization of the aspirations of ethnic minorities for structural assimilation, they do not appear to be very effective as an instrument through which the minority can protect itself against behavioural assimilation.

On the other hand, an ethnic minority which has obtained a substantial degree of structural assimilation can afford to abandon the one-party tactic--a symptom of its subordinate position--and distribute its support more equally between the major parties. This need not occur as the result of a conscious strategy; but could be

expected to happen as members of the ethnic group become increasingly aware of their interests as town-dwellers or country-dwellers, as members of different occupation-groups, or - in short - aware of their interests as defined by other politically-relevant characteristics. At the same time, explicitly ethnic demands may be articulated through voluntary associations and brought to the attention of the leaders of the major political parties, the civil service, and the cabinet. Although parties would not be effective as structural mechanisms for the articulation of demands of this kind, if for electoral or other considerations they dampened opposition to measures taken to meet ethnic demands, demand-reduction of this kind would then operate in the interests of the ethnic minority.

* * *

It is now possible to offer a general, though tentative, estimate of political parties in promoting the cohesion of the Canadian political community.

The role of political parties in increasing the responsiveness of the political system to social needs and political demands is significant, though limited. Parties constitute one of several structural mechanisms for the articulation of political demands. Although they are well adapted to representing the interests of individuals and

localities, the effective representation of other categories of interest cannot be achieved by political parties alone. Collaboration between voluntary associations and political parties in articulating the interests of geographically-dispersed groups could be expected to increase the responsiveness of the system to the demands of such groups; but under the circumstances noted in the constituency studies, there seemed to be little immediate prospect of constituency party organizations and voluntary associations acting in concert. The failure of constituency party organizations to undertake policy-oriented activities left them ill-equipped to articulate the interests especially of unorganized groups, and to mobilize popular support for policies which might be expected to incur opposition from powerful, though perhaps numerically-small, groups.

In the case of the interests of ethnic minorities, parties again appeared to be effective in increasing the responsiveness of the system to certain categories of demands, and ineffective in relation to others. Specifically, parties were thought to promote the structural assimilation of ethnic minorities but not to be a structural mechanism adapted to protecting the minority against behavioural assimilation.

The limited role of parties in increasing the responsiveness of the system to the demands of ethnic minorities and other groups is complemented by their role in demand-reduction. If there are adequate structural mechanisms to transmit the demands of powerful groups to the authorities,

the system may be able to respond favourably to their demands, thereby securing their support for the regime and the political community. Though parties may not play a very prominent role in this process, they may nevertheless attenuate stress on the system by the reduction of opposing demands where demand-reduction is practised in relation to the interests of small groups, or even in relation to weakly-articulated interests of larger groups, it may be expected to conduce to the cohesion of the political community. For example, if a large ethnic minority formulates inflexible demands, the authorities may generate support from the minority by responding favourably to its demands, while the parties dampen criticism from members of the majority. This endeavour could be expected to be successful only in instances where the majority is relatively indifferent or even sympathetic towards minority demands, and where the minority does not accord its support almost exclusively to one party.

Of course, political conflicts within any given political community may arouse such animosity between groups that the system is unable to persist unless the authorities maintain order by having recourse to coercive measures on a large scale, thus lessening their dependence on more spontaneous support; and even then the widespread use of force may be unable to hold the system together. Nevertheless, a judicious combination of responsiveness to the demands of large and powerful groups, and demand-reduction in relation to less potent interests, can be expected to contribute to

the cohesion of the political community under a democratic regime. Depending on the nature of political cleavage and other environmental factors, political parties may be able to contribute substantially to this end.

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APPENDIX I

A NOTE ON METHOD

Each of the constituency studies is based primarily on interviews with residents of the district and a small number of people from outside the area.

Procedure

The first step in each case was to obtain a personal impression of the constituency: its social structure, main industries, the more active voluntary associations, the material well-being of various groups, the identity of persons reputed to be local "influentials," the political situation. Interviews were accordingly obtained with persons whose jobs brought them into daily contact with many people-- newspaper editors, priests, trade union officials, government employees, university personnel. In these interviews the respondents were asked for their opinions on the subjects of our inquiry, and lists of names of possible interviewees were obtained.

The information drawn from these interviews helped us to form a tentative overall view of the district--a sort of portraiture by collage . The primary purpose of this initial stage was to raise questions for subsequent investigation, and to suggest avenues of approach to them. Although our impressions on some matters were reported in the constituency studies, care was taken in such instances to indicate the

intuitive basis of the remarks.

The main phase of each constituency study consisted of interviews with the personnel of voluntary associations and political parties. The content of these interviews depended on the subjects on which we hoped to obtain information; generally we asked our respondents for information about the structure and activities of their organization, and then discussed with them, in an informal way, some of the questions which had come up during the first stage of our study.

No uniform schedule of questions was adhered to. Interviews varied in length from a few minutes to several hours, according to the value of the information which could be obtained from the respondent, and the length of time which he could afford to spend with us. In addition to factual information about the affairs of the organization(s) in which the respondent was active--the main subject of each interview--we obtained in most instances a list of organizations to which he belonged and a profile of his political activities (membership and activities in political parties, voting behaviour). We also asked interviewees for their opinions on some current political issues, local and otherwise.

Use Made of Material

Statements of fact which have been reported in the constituency studies were ascertained from at least two interviewees, usually more. When statements were made by respondents concerning other individuals, care was taken to verify them from the individuals concerned. Exceptions to

this procedure were noted in the text.

Interpretive remarks were based primarily on inference from factual information, and, of course the reasons for interpretations given were explained in each instance. In some cases impressionistic evidence (e.g. pertaining to political attitudes) was also adduced to supplement other grounds for interpretive remarks. It is to be emphasized that in no instance was evidence which was drawn from statements of opinions or attitudes made by respondents presented as being a statistically reliable sample of leaders of voluntary associations, or political parties. Indeed, in view of the widely varying length and content of the interviews, tabulations of data obtained would not generally have been meaningful. It was impossible to obtain a statistically significant number of responses to our questions of political attitudes or on cross-memberships between parties and voluntary associations; in any case, our interviewees were not chosen according to methods required for an accurate sample survey.

APPENDIX II

FACTORS AFFECTING THE PERSISTENCE OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

David Easton, in his A Systems Analysis of Political Life,¹ identifies two main sources of stress on political systems, demand stress and stress on support. There is a reciprocal relationship between the two.

We have discussed in the text of this study both demand-reduction and the generation of support as means of conducting to the persistence of the political system. I wish here simply to append a note to explain why Easton's analysis was not followed in greater detail.

Demand-reduction. Demand stress, according to Easton, may arise from an excessive volume of demands or from the content of demands: if either volume or content is such that the system fails to respond adequately to them, support for the system will be undermined. On the other hand, stress on the system may be attenuated by eliminating potentially disruptive demands.

In view of the scope of this study, we focussed exclusively on the role of parties in demand reduction but it is not consequently to be assumed that action by parties is the only way in which demand-reduction occurs. Cultural mechanisms, as well as structural mechanisms, operate to determine both the volume and content of demands which are

¹David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965).

formulated, and with which the system must deal. Moreover, there are other structural mechanisms than political parties which effectively reduce the volume of demands, both at the point at which wants are converted into political demands, and at subsequent points in the political process. Generally-speaking, those structures which contribute to interest-articulation the formulation and voicing of demands are also strategically placed to reduce the volume of demands--simply by failing to articulate some of them, or by inattention to them after they have been articulated by others.

The generation of support. A large part of A Systems Analysis of Political Life is devoted to describing the generation of support for the authorities, the regime, and the political community in spite of deficiencies in the responsiveness of the system. This process Easton refers to as the generation of "diffuse support", as opposed to the specific support which is generated by the direct satisfaction of demands. Diffuse support may be created by fostering (a) the general acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the regime (the widespread acceptance of an obligation to obey the authorities), (b) a belief in the existence of a common interest between members of the political community, and (c) a psychological identification with the political community (e.g. patriotism). Easton comments:

Except in the long run, diffuse support is independent of the effects of daily outputs. It consists of a reserve of support that enables a system to weather the many storms when outputs cannot be balanced off against

inputs of demands. . It is a kind of support that a system does not have to buy with more or less direct benefits for the obligations and responsibilities the member occurs.¹

In this study we have focussed attention on the generation of specific, not diffuse, support. It is true that parties do have an important role to play in spreading the belief in legitimacy and in the existence of a common interest. They also may foster a psychological identification with the political community. We have not considered the role of parties in these respects, however, partly because too diffuse a focus of attention would have made the study unmanageable, but mostly because in the long run diffuse support is dependent on the responsiveness of the system to political demands. As I have explained in Chapter II, the current threat to Canadian unity appears to have arisen from the system's failure to respond to the minimal demands of a major group--with the result that to many Canadians the regime is appearing progressively less legitimate; there is decreasing belief in the existence of a common interest and a steadily weakening psychological identification with the political community. For this reason we focussed on the role of parties in generating specific support by increasing the responsiveness of the system to political demands.

¹Ibid., p. 273.

APPENDIX III

FURTHER RESEARCH: SOME POSSIBLE LINES OF INQUIRY

This study touches on many themes. Each reader will bring to it his own experience and understanding, with the result that some points to which I have given only cursory attention may, according to the interests of the individual reader, suggest questions or hypotheses craving further exploration. Hence, in suggesting some possible lines of inquiry for further research, I offer a somewhat personal statement of my own research interests and some ideas, still incompletely formed, about how they might be pursued. I shall suggest three areas of study.

Structural mechanisms for representing group interests.

My comments about the respective roles of political parties and voluntary associations in representing the interests of geographically-dispersed groups deserve more complete study, including empirical research on the activities of more senior levels of each type of organization, and the relationship between them. Rather more attention ought also, I believe, to be paid to the role of the civil service as a channel of interest-articulation, both as a result of contacts between the higher civil servants and top-ranking officers of voluntary associations, and by virtue of the daily contact between administrators at the local level and the public--individuals and organized groups.

Probably the most satisfactory way of understanding the inter-relationships between these three types of structure

would be to study the antecedents of particular governmental decisions, or to investigate particular areas of government activity. The type of study I envisage would include an attempt not only to explain why particular decisions were made, but to explore also the attempts--perhaps abortive ones--to influence the government's action.

This approach would, I think, help us to understand the respective roles of political parties and voluntary associations in mobilizing support for desired policy objectives, while simultaneously delineating the importance, under a variety of circumstances, of political resources other than the strength of numbers--resources such as wealth, leadership, technical competence, strategic position (as in the case of a public transport union), or ability to mould public opinion (as in the case of religious leaders or owners of news media).

A further advantage in this approach is that it would serve to focus attention on the role of individuals in key positions between the public at large and the decision-makers, particularly the cabinet. Persons in these intermediate roles would include members of the legislature, officers of voluntary associations, and medium-ranking civil service personnel: these individuals have the responsibility in many cases of interpreting public opinion and political forces to the decision-makers, while simultaneously applying governmental policies or attempting to mobilize support or opposition to them.

The role of constituency party organizations. The foremost recent example of the study of local party organ-

ization is Samuel J. Eldersveld's Political Parties: A Behavioural Analysis.¹ Eldersveld there analyzed data obtained from interviews with a random sample of precinct chairmen and a representative cross-section of 600 adults from the precincts in the study. Additional studies of this kind would be valuable, although I think that the results would be enriched if this research technique were employed within a framework in some respects more like the one followed in my own three constituency studies.

My initial plan for this study was similar to Eldersveld's. I proposed to interview a representative sample of party activists within several constituencies, and another sample of party activists within several constituencies, and another sample of "community leaders" to be selected by identifying leaders of a variety of voluntary associations, church groups, and civic bodies. The intention was to assess the sensitivity of parties to local conditions by cross-tabulating data relating to membership in different organizations, thus (I thought) probing the relationship between "political leadership" and "community leadership". A rather larger number of constituencies would have been studied, perhaps eight.

This plan was quickly abandoned after preliminary work in the field because it appeared that the results would have been either trivial or misleading: to study the sensitivity of political parties to local conditions by obtaining data on cross-membership between political and other local organ-

¹Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioural Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).

izations would have been to fail to take account of political cleavages within the community. The content of the project was revised to include a more intensive study of fewer constituencies, along the lines reported in the main body of this work.

Thus a project initially quite similar to Eldersveld's study was modified to focus on questions of policy affecting local residents. Had the resources been available, however, it would have been valuable to include a fuller investigation of the activities of partisans, and the political participation and political attitudes of a larger number of local "influentials" in a wider range of non-partisan organizations.


A series of further studies along these lines would enable us to assess more accurately the role of local party organizations, in relation to the changing structure of their social environment.

Party organization and political culture. A third area of inquiry which has suggested itself to me during the course of research for this project is the investigation of political culture and its effects on local party organization. In this study I have made an attempt to assess the political attitudes of party workers and of leaders of non-partisan organizations, but more systematic enquiries into local political culture would contribute valuable information concerning environmental influences on the structure and activities of constituency political parties.


It will be recalled that in our analysis of the findings

of the study of St. Henri we were unable to tell to what extent the members of the citizens' committees were typical of the residents of the district as a whole. Had we been able to assess political attitudes in St. Henri generally, and not only the political attitudes of our interviewees in the committees, the significance of our findings would have been much clearer.

To obtain the desired information, it would be necessary to undertake a study by sample survey, analyzing the results according to income level and other characteristics of the respondents. Any correlation between class and political culture would be particularly interesting, because it would provide important insights into the reasons for the difficulty of mobilizing the support of numerically-large groups behind demands articulated on their behalf.




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PLACE ST. HENRI

RUE NOTRE DAME

PARC CARTIER

RUE NOTRE DAME

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CHEMIN DE LA CITE ST. PAUL

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
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